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I. INTRODUCTION 
Late in 2005, as many as two million1 computer users learned that 
software unknowingly installed on their machines effectively ceded con-
trol of their computers and data to any enterprising hacker with the neces-
sary ill intent. This software tool, known as a rootkit, enabled a host of 
attacks on individual users and both private and public network infrastruc-
ture. But the rootkit, a tool rarely employed by legitimate software devel-
opers,2 was not installed by a virus attached to unscanned e-mails, nor was 
it bundled with adware developed by a disreputable vendor. It was instead 
distributed by Sony BMG Music Entertainment (Sony BMG), the world’s 
second largest record label,3 on millions of Compact Discs (CDs) sold to 
an unsuspecting public. The unwitting recipients of this software, Sony 
BMG’s own customers, did no more than attempt to listen to lawfully pur-
chased music on their computers. 
                                                                                                                         
 1. Jefferson Graham, Sony to Pull Controversial CDs, Offer Swap, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 15, 2005, at 1B; Tom Zeller Jr., Sony BMG Stirs a Debate Over Software Used to 
Guard Content, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at C1.  
 2. Rootkits have been used in some instances by anti-virus software developers to 
protect their software from attack, but this incorporation of a rootkit into otherwise le-
gitimate software sparked significant debate. See MCAFEE, ROOTKITS, PART 1 OF 3: THE 
GROWING THREAT (2006), http://download.nai.com/products/mcafee-avert/WhitePapers/-
AKapoor_Rootkits1.pdf. 
 3. Bertelsmann.com, BMG—A Passion for Music, http://www.bertelsmann.com/-
bertelsmann_corp/wms41/bm/index.php?ci=26&language=2 (last visited Sept. 6, 2007). 
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By the time the Sony BMG rootkit found its way to store shelves, CD-
based copy protection schemes were nothing new. A variety of protection 
measures had been introduced on previous major label releases.4 Although 
they differed in technological detail, these measures all aimed to disable or 
limit the ability of customers to access and copy music contained on CDs. 
XCP, a CD-based protection measure developed by First4Internet and 
distributed by Sony BMG,5 initially appeared to be no different than its 
predecessors. XCP created generally unwanted and unexpected restrictions 
on the ability to use lawfully purchased CDs. But in October of 2005, after 
CDs protected by XCP had been on the market for several months, com-
puter engineer and security expert Mark Russinovich discovered that XCP 
incorporated a rootkit.6 While Russinovich was not the first security re-
searcher to uncover problems with Sony BMG’s protection measures, he 
was the first to publicly disclose the presence of the rootkit because of the 
pall hanging over research in this field.7 A blog post authored by Russino-
vich, and the media response it prompted,8 alerted the public to the pres-
ence of the rootkit, offering the first glimpses into the potential security 
disaster enabled by Sony BMG’s DRM. 
As the public learned in the wake of Russinovich’s disclosure, rootkits 
are software tools, frequently employed by developers of malicious soft-
                                                                                                                         
 4. See, e.g., J. ALEX HALDERMAN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, ANALYSIS OF THE ME-
DIAMAX CD3 COPY-PREVENTION SYSTEM 1 (2003), ftp://ftp.cs.princeton.edu/tech-
reports/2003/679.pdf; Evan Hansen, Celine Dion Disc Could Crash European PCs, 
ZDNET.CO.UK, Apr. 5, 2002, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,1000000097,2107848,-
00.htm; John Leyden, Marker Pens, Sticky Tape Crack Music CD Protection, THE REG-
ISTER, May 14, 2002, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/05/14/marker_pens_sticky_-
tape_crack/ (discussing how a Celine Dion CD can prevent Macs from rebooting); Tony 
Smith, BMG to Replace Anti-Rip Natalie Imbruglia CDs, THE REGISTER, Nov. 19, 2001, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/19/bmg_to_replace_antirip_natalie/.  
 5. The other three major labels—Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, 
and EMI—were also First4Internet customers and had included XCP on certain pre-
release materials. See Sony Tests Technology to Limit CD Burning, CNET.CO.UK, June 1, 
2005, http://news.cnet.co.uk/digitalmusic/0,39029666,39189658,00.htm.  
 6. Mark’s Blog, http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/31/-
sony-rootkits-and-digital-rights-management-gone-too-far.aspx (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 
PST). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See Mark’s Blog, http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/-
31/sony-rootkits-and-digital-rights-management-gone-too-far.aspx (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 
PST); Paul F. Roberts, Sony BMG Hacking Into CD Buyers’ Computers, FOXNEWS.COM, 
Nov. 03, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,174334,00.html; Francis Till, Sony 
Plants Secret Controls on PCs, NAT’L BUS. REV., Nov. 3, 2005, http://www.nbr.co.nz/-
home/column_article.asp?id=13371&cid=3&cname=Technology. 
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ware (malware),9 that allow programmers to cloak files and processes, ef-
fectively hiding their existence and operation from both a computer’s user 
and the machine’s operating system.10 These cloaking devices can facili-
tate any number of attacks on individual computers including coordinated 
offenses against websites, computer networks, and the internet itself. Once 
installed, a rootkit can be used to hide any code, regardless of its author’s 
original purpose. As such, a hacker’s ambition and imagination serve as 
the primary constraints on the destructive effects rootkits enable.11  
While Sony BMG’s customers first became aware of the dangers 
posed by the rootkit through media reports following Russinovich’s Octo-
ber 31 announcement, the company was on notice that its product con-
tained a rootkit, at the very least, four weeks earlier.12 Finnish anti-virus 
software developer F-Secure contacted Sony BMG on October 4, 2005, 
alerting it to the presence of the rootkit.13 Of course, First4Internet, as the 
developer that chose to incorporate the rootkit into its design, necessarily 
knew of its presence from the outset.  
                                                                                                                         
 9. “Malware,” short for malicious software, is a catch-all term that refers to any 
software designed to cause damage to a single computer, server, or computer network, 
and includes spyware, viruses, and other varieties of harmful software. Robert Moir, De-
fining Malware: FAQ, Oct. 1, 2003, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/alerts/-
info/malware.mspx; see also Adam Baratz & Charles McLaughlin, Malware: What is It 
and How to Prevent It, ARS TECHNICA, Nov. 11, 2004, http://arstechnica.com/articles/-
paedia/malware.ars. 
 10. GREG HOGLUND & JAMES BUTLER, ROOTKITS: SUBVERTING THE WINDOWS 
KERNEL 4, 8-10 (Addison-Wesley ed., 2005). Within the computer security community, 
there was some debate over the proper classification of XCP. Some deemed XCP a root-
kit, while others applied the more ambiguous label of Potentially Unwanted Program. See 
MCAFEE, supra note 2, at 3. 
 11. Hackers could exploit the cloaking capabilities of the XCP rootkit simply by 
adding the prefix “$sys$” to the name of any files they chose to obscure. J. Alex Halder-
man & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode, in USENIX ASS’N, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM 77, 18 (2006), available at 
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf (updated version). 
 12. Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/-
?p=937 (Nov. 30, 2005, 06:41 EST).  
 13. Steve Hamm, Sony BMG’s Costly Silence, BUS. WK., Nov. 29, 2005, http://-
www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2005/tc20051129_938966.htm. In fact, 
according to Thomas Hesse, President of Sony BMG’s Global Digital Business group, 
the alert from F-Secure was seen as a “routine matter” and “did not suggest that this 
software was anything but benign.” Id. Even after F-Secure explained that the rootkit 
posed a major security risk, Sony BMG “didn’t seem inclined to do anything about the 
CDs that were already in circulation” and “wanted to keep the problem quiet.” Id. 
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Although Sony BMG claimed it was taking steps to address the is-
sue,14 it took no discernible action until Russinovich made the threat posed 
by the software a matter of public knowledge. And even then, Sony BMG 
attempted to downplay the importance of the rootkit discovery. As Tho-
mas Hesse, Sony BMG’s President of Global Digital Business, rhetori-
cally asked, “Most people, I think, don’t even know what a rootkit is, so 
why should they care about it?”15 
Subsequently, in an attempt to mollify customers who had already 
purchased the infected CDs, Sony BMG offered tools to uninstall XCP.16 
But, as discussed infra, those tools did more harm than good.17 In order to 
stem the tide of public outcry and potentially mitigate further damages, 
Sony BMG finally announced in mid-November its intention to recall the 
millions of XCP-infected CDs that remained in the retail chain.18 
But even before the XCP recall was announced, the focus of scrutiny 
began to shift to Sony BMG’s other preferred technological protection 
measure, SunnComm’s MediaMax software. Unlike XCP, MediaMax did 
not employ a rootkit, but it did, however, introduce other significant secu-
rity vulnerabilities. 
MediaMax enabled a dangerous privilege escalation.19 When installed, 
MediaMax created a directory called “SunnComm Shared” on the user’s 
hard drive.20 MediaMax set file permissions for this directory and its con-
tents that enabled any user of the computer, whether she had administrator 
privileges or not, to read, modify, or delete the contents of the directory.21 
These permissions enabled a guest or remote user to replace the Media-
                                                                                                                         
 14. Id. 
 15. Neda Ulaby, Sony Music CDs Under Fire from Privacy Advocates (National 
Public Radio Program broadcast Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/tem-
plates/story/story.php?storyId=4989260. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
 18. Tom Zeller, Jr., CD’s Recalled for Posing Risk to PC’s, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2005, at C1. 
 19. See Wikipedia, Privilege Escalation, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege-
_escalation (last modified July 26, 2007) (“Privilege escalation is the act of exploiting a 
bug in an application to gain access to resources which normally would have been pro-
tected from an application or user. The result is that the application performs actions with 
a higher security context than intended by the application developer or system adminis-
trator.”). 
 20. Jesse Burns & Alex Stamos, Information Security Partners, Media Max Access 
Control Vulnerability 1 (2005), http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/MediaMax-
VulnerabilityReport.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
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Max files with malicious code, either intentionally or inadvertently. When 
a user with administrator privileges later inserted a MediaMax disc, that 
malicious code would be activated, triggering all manner of potential at-
tacks.22 When SunnComm released a patch to address this threat, it created 
vulnerabilities similar to those caused by the XCP uninstall tool.23 
Second and more fundamentally, MediaMax requires a user to possess 
administrator privileges simply to listen to a CD.24 Requiring the use of an 
administrator account for such mundane purposes is both “unnecessary 
and dangerous.”25 Further compounding the security vulnerabilities cre-
ated by MediaMax, one component of the software, a kernel process capa-
ble of altering any aspect of the system, is loaded into memory at all times, 
regardless of the presence of a MediaMax CD.26 
Although the technological source of the security threats introduced by 
XCP and MediaMax differed, as researchers soon discovered, the creators 
of both protection measures exhibited other behavior typically associated 
with the purveyors of spyware. For example, the software End User Li-
cense Agreements (EULAs) were rife with overreaching terms.27 More 
troublingly, some of the EULA terms were simply untrue. The EULAs 
professed that the software would collect no information about the user or 
her computer,28 as did assurances offered by SunnComm and Sony BMG 
on their websites29 and in the press.30 But despite the obvious sensitivity to 
                                                                                                                         
 22. Id at 5. 
 23. Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=942 (Dec. 7, 2005, 10:33 EST). The original patch was later replaced with 
one that avoided these problems. Id. 
 24. Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=934 (Nov. 22, 2005, 03:51 EST).  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. The Sony BMG EULA terminated the rights of consumers if, inter alia, the 
original CD was stolen or the user filed for bankruptcy. The EULA also prohibited users 
from using the CD on an office computer, limited Sony BMG’s liability to $5.00, and 
permitted Sony BMG to install and use backdoors in the copy protection software or me-
dia player to enforce its rights at any time, without notice. See Fred von Lohmann, Now 
the Legalese Rootkit: Sony-BMG’s EULA, DEEP LINKS, Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.eff.-
org/deeplinks/archives/004145.php. 
 28. See infra text accompanying note 214. 
 29. Posting of J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=925 (Nov. 12, 2005, 12:30 EST). 
 30. See, e.g., Sony Sued Over Controversial CDs, BBC NEWS, Nov. 22, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4459620.stm; Carrie Kirby, Sony Gets an Earful 
Over CD Software; Program to Block Music Piracy Prompts Privacy, Security Worries, 
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 2005, at A1; Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, 
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privacy concerns reflected in the public statements issued by these compa-
nies,31 the behavior of their protection measures told a different story. 
Each time a user listened to a MediaMax or XCP-protected CD, data were 
collected and transmitted to Sony BMG that included the user’s IP address 
and a code corresponding to the particular CD title.32 
Even if a user declined the Sony BMG EULA, thereby forgoing the 
ability to access the CD on a computer,33 components of the MediaMax 
software were loaded temporarily onto the user’s machine.34 One compo-
nent—a device driver that interfered with the ability of the computer’s 
CD-ROM drive to copy data—was often permanently installed despite the 
computer owner’s explicit refusal of the EULA terms.35 This driver was 
loaded as part of the Windows kernel and could potentially “control virtu-
ally any aspect of the computer’s operation.”36  
Compounding these concerns, both First4Internet and SunnComm, 
like many malware vendors, initially failed to provide users with an unin-
staller to remove their software in its entirety.37 After news of the XCP 
                                                                                                                         
WIRED, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymat-
ters/2005/11/69601. 
 31. This sensitivity was likely due, in part, to earlier controversy over media players 
that report users’ listening and viewing habits. After a security consultant discovered that 
the RealJukebox transmitted to RealNetworks a unique code corresponding to each cus-
tomer and the names of the CDs to which each user listened, Real quickly issued a patch 
that disabled the transmission of this data. See Stuart J. Johnston, RealPrivacy in the New 
Millennium?, PCWORLD, Dec. 17, 1999, http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,14419-page,-
1/article.html. 
 32. Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/-
?p=923 (Nov. 10, 2005, 08:25 EST); Mark’s Blog, http://blogs.technet.com/-
markrussinovich/archive/2005/11/04/more-on-sony-dangerous-decloaking-patch-eulas-
and-phoning-home.aspx (Nov. 4, 2005 12:04 PST); posting of J. Alex Halderman to 
Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=925 (Nov. 12, 2005, 12:30 
EST). At least in part, this software served a fairly benign function—namely, to update 
images and lyrics displayed while users listened to the CD. 
 33. If a user declined to accept the EULA, the CD was automatically ejected. Hal-
derman & Felten, supra note 11, at 6. 
 34. Id. at 7; Posting of J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.free-
dom-to-tinker.com/?p=925 (Nov. 12, 2005 12:30 EST); Posting of J. Alex Halderman to 
Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=936 (Nov. 28, 2005 14:23 
EST). 
 35. Posting of J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=936 (Nov. 28, 2005 14:23 EST). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=923 (Nov. 10, 2005, 08:25 EST); Halderman & Felten, supra note 11, at 
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rootkit broke, Sony BMG initially offered a software update that, in its 
words, “remove[d] the cloaking technology component that has been re-
cently discussed in a number of articles.”38 Given the size of the update 
and its creation of new files on the user’s computer, some suggested that 
the update simply replaced one cloaking mechanism with another.39  
Once mounting public pressure demanded that uninstallers be pro-
vided, Sony BMG required customers to endure a Byzantine series of 
webpages, e-mails, and downloads before finally ridding themselves of 
XCP.40 But Sony BMG’s missteps were not limited to a lack of transpar-
ency and convenience. The web-based XCP uninstaller created security 
threats equal in magnitude to the rootkit it was intended to eliminate, per-
mitting malicious code embedded in any website to attack unsuspecting 
customers who took steps to protect their machines by uninstalling the 
rootkit.41 Days later, when SunnComm announced a web-based uninstaller 
for its Media Max DRM, it suffered from a nearly identical flaw.42 
The temptation to write off Sony BMG’s long and unfortunate series 
of missteps as a display of utter disregard, or even contempt, for user secu-
rity and privacy is a strong one. Although the truth likely contains some 
traces of these simple narratives, any reconstruction of the rootkit incident 
that approaches reality reveals a more complicated story. Casting Sony 
BMG as a hapless licensee of flawed protection measures developed by 
irresponsible third party vendors does not shed any light on the possible 
                                                                                                                         
14; Posting of J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=925 (Nov. 12, 2005, 12:30 EST). 
 38. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Software Updates/Plug-ins (Nov. 7, 2005), 
http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/english/updates.html, available at http://web.archive.org/-
web/20051107020216/http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/english/updates.html (last visited Sept. 
6, 2007). 
 39. Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.-
com/?p=921 (Nov. 3, 2005, 07:35 EST). 
 40. Mark’s Blog, http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/11/09/-
sony-you-don-t-reeeeaaaally-want-to-uninstall-do-you.aspx (Nov. 9, 2005, 11:31 PST); 
Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=923 
(Nov. 10, 2005, 08:25 EST). SunnComm required similar steps. Posting of J. Alex Hal-
derman to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=931 (Nov. 17, 
2005, 13:46 EST). 
 41. Posting of J. Alex Halderman & Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.-
freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=927 (Nov. 15, 2005 07:07 EST); Posting of J. Alex Halderman 
to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=928 (Nov. 15, 2005, 15:46 
EST). 
 42. Posting of J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=931 (Nov. 17, 2005, 13:46 EST). 
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failures of internal procedures to identify and prevent such mishaps and 
the misalignment of interests that cause them. Understanding the complex 
array of factors that contributed to Sony BMG’s actions and reactions is an 
essential first step toward the adoption of policies and mechanisms to pre-
vent similar incidents in the future. 
This Article aims to identify the market, technological, and legal fac-
tors that appear to have led a presumably rational actor toward a strategy 
that in retrospect appears obviously and fundamentally misguided. Part II 
begins by considering the harm that resulted from Sony BMG’s DRM 
strategy—both the damage to Sony BMG and its customers as well as the 
negative externalities imposed on a broad range of third parties. Part III 
examines potential market-based rationales that influenced Sony BMG’s 
deployment of these DRM systems and reveals that even the most charita-
ble interpretation of Sony BMG’s internal strategizing demonstrates a 
failure to adequately value security and privacy. After taking stock of the 
then-existing technological environment that both encouraged and enabled 
the distribution of these protection measures in Part IV, we examine law, 
the third vector of influence on Sony BMG’s decision to release flawed 
protection measures into the wild, in Part V. We argue that existing doc-
trine in the fields of contract, intellectual property, and consumer protec-
tion law fails to adequately counter the technological and market forces 
that allowed a self-interested actor to inflict such harms on the public.  
Finally in Part VI, we present two recommendations aimed at reducing 
the likelihood of companies deploying protection measures with known 
security vulnerabilities in the consumer marketplace. First, we suggest that 
Congress should alter the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by 
creating permanent exemptions from its anti-circumvention and anti-
trafficking provisions in order to enable security research and the dissemi-
nation of tools to remove harmful protection measures. Second, we offer 
promising ways to leverage insights from the field of human computer in-
teraction security (HCI-Sec) to develop a stronger framework for user con-
trol over the security and privacy aspects of computers. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), under its existing authority to protect consumers from 
deceptive and unfair practices, could develop best practices and regula-
tions regarding the installation of software and the collection and trans-
mission of information about users, their computers, and their actions. In 
addition, we recommend that the FTC explore the development of stan-
dards for security in the context of software and online data collection ac-
tivities.  
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II. UNDISCLOSED HARM AND EXTERNALITIES 
Before attempting to reconstruct the system of incentives that impelled 
Sony BMG to distribute the XCP and MediaMax protection measures, a 
clear accounting of both the actual and potential damage wrought by these 
technologies is in order. The harms flowing from the rootkit incident were 
varied and wide-reaching. The security flaws inherent in Sony BMG’s 
DRM left users open to attack, and the DRM collected data about users’ 
private activities without proper disclosure. Moreover, Sony BMG, as well 
as its artists, suffered damage to their reputation and bottom line as a result 
of the rootkit incident. But the effects of the rootkit extended well beyond 
the parties to these transactions. The rootkit incident threatened both the 
security of the network infrastructure and the future of DRM technology.  
This Part briefly summarizes the harms suffered by the parties directly 
involved in the rootkit incident and then considers the broad social costs 
that resulted from Sony BMG’s failure to fully account for the impact of 
its technology. 
A. Direct Harm to Sony BMG, its Artists, and its Customers 
The vulnerabilities created by Sony BMG’s DRM gave rise to an array 
of potential abuses. The XCP rootkit permitted a hacker to write malicious 
code that, once installed on a user’s computer, would run undetected so 
long as the name of the file containing that code began with the prefix 
“$sys$.”43 Similarly, the MediaMax privilege escalation allowed an at-
tacker to replace code installed on users’ machines and automatically exe-
cuted upon insertion of a MediaMax disc.44 Practically any malicious code 
authored by a hacker could take advantage of these general purpose secu-
rity holes. The user’s data could be altered, deleted, or even held for ran-
som; the machine could be rendered inoperable; a program could sniff 
sensitive passwords or collect financial records and other personal data; 
trade secrets and other corporate information could be collected; illegal 
data could be downloaded and stored on the user’s machine. In short, these 
protection measures provided the means for remote attackers to take con-
trol of customers’ computers. 
Although these attacks represent worst case scenarios, the threats 
posed by Sony BMG’s DRM were far from theoretical. Within days of the 
public rootkit announcement, malicious code leveraging the XCP protec-
tion scheme to hide from antivirus programs and system administrators 
                                                                                                                         
 43. Halderman & Felten, supra note 11, at 18.  
 44. Id. at 17. 
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was spreading across the internet. A Trojan Horse45 discovered early in 
November of 200546—variously referred to as Backdoor.Ryknos,47 Bre-
plibot,48 and Stinx-E49—attempted to take advantage of the cloaking capa-
bilities of the rootkit.50 Backdoor.Ryknos was transmitted via spam e-mail 
messages. Once on a user’s system, it opened a back door to connect to an 
IRC51 channel where the attacker could remotely control the user’s sys-
tem.52 The remote attacker could download, delete, and execute files,53 
and send information about the compromised machine.54 Antivirus and 
security software providers, already on the lookout for code intended to 
take advantage of the rootkit, quickly mobilized to identify and remove 
this Trojan. The high profile of the Sony BMG rootkit, coupled with this 
speedy response, likely discouraged others from attempting to further ex-
ploit the rootkit vulnerability. 
To make matters worse, Sony BMG’s surreptitious software installa-
tion and undisclosed data collection impeded the ability of computer users 
to make informed choices about security and privacy. The “phone home” 
feature of Sony BMG’s DRM undermined customer privacy by collecting 
and transmitting information about users’ interactions with protected CDs, 
including users’ IP addresses.55 But the EULA governing DRM-protected 
                                                                                                                         
 45. Trojan Horses are programs that may appear benign or useful but in fact harbor 
malicious code. See MCAFEE, supra note 2, at 4. 
 46. Elia Florio, Symantec.com, Backdoor.Ryknos—Technical Details, http://www.-
symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-111012-2048-99&tabid=2 (last 
updated Feb. 13, 2007). 
 47. See Elia Florio, Symantec.com, Backdoor.Ryknos—Summary, http://www.-
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 48. See Jarkko Turkulainen, F-Secure.com, F-Secure Virus Descriptions: 
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2005); McAfee Threat Center, W32/Brepibot, http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_133091. -
htm#VirusChar (last updated Feb. 1, 2006). 
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 50. Florio, supra note 47. 
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communication. See generally Wikipedia, Internet Relay Chat, http://en.wikipedia.org/-
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 52. Florio, supra note 46. 
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 54. Florio, supra note 46. 
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provide sufficient data to identify the user’s location and identity. PETER ECKERSLEY ET 
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Sony BMG CDs explicitly disavowed any collection or dissemination of 
data related to customers or their computers. These misleading terms ren-
dered Sony BMG customers incapable of offering informed consent to the 
data collection engaged in by XCP and MediaMax. Through this duplicity, 
Sony BMG deprived its customers of the ability to protect their own pri-
vacy. 
Sony BMG also failed to disclose adequately the security failures of its 
DRM. Components of these measures were installed—sometimes perma-
nently—before customers were confronted with the EULA terms.56 The 
CD packaging, which was the only means of pre-installation notice, con-
tained precious few indicia of the DRM contained within. The CD jewel 
cases featured the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI) “Content Protected” logo on their spines57 and a small nondescript 
“content protection grid” that provided general information and system 
requirements on their back covers.58 These half-hearted disclosures failed 
to provide Sony BMG customers with fair warning of the security and pri-
vacy threats created by these DRM schemes or the scope of the limitations 
that they imposed on the use of the media. 
Once the public became aware of the undisclosed costs of XCP and 
MediaMax, Sony BMG discovered that it was not insulated from the fall-
out of its own DRM strategy. CDs distributed with these protection meas-
ures experienced a steep drop-off in sales within some market segments. 
Later, the recall of millions of XCP and MediaMax discs led to significant 
expense and further lost sales opportunities.59 In addition, Sony BMG 
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spent millions to settle the steady stream of lawsuits arising out of the 
rootkit incident.60 Less quantifiably, the resulting backlash from artists and 
customers significantly damaged the reputations of Sony BMG and its 
parent corporations. 
Potential customers who were aware of the existence and dangers 
posed by Sony BMG’s protection measures steered clear of XCP discs. 
The sales history of Get Right with the Man, an XCP-infected album by 
Van Zant that was released some six months prior to the rootkit an-
nouncement, is emblematic of the online retail impact of the rootkit inci-
dent. On November 2, just two days after the initial public announcement 
of the rootkit, Get Right with the Man ranked at number 887 on the music 
charts at Amazon.com.61 The next day, after Amazon user reviews alerted 
shoppers to the dangers posed by XCP, the album dropped to number 
1,392.62 By the Thanksgiving holiday weekend, the XCP recall was un-
derway and the album plummeted to number 25,802.63 In contrast, in retail 
environments in which customers had less immediate access to informa-
tion about the dangers of XCP, sales of Get Right with the Man were rela-
tively undisturbed.64 Since brick and mortar retailers like Wal-Mart, the 
nation’s leading seller of CDs,65 do not facilitate the sort of customer 
feedback common to online retailers, this outcome is hardly surprising. 
Once Sony BMG instituted the recall of the remaining XCP-protected 
discs, and later MediaMax CDs, its albums were largely unavailable for 
purchase. In total, Sony BMG recalled 4.7 million XCP-protected CDs, 
roughly 2.6 million of which had not yet been sold.66 The XCP recall cost 
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Sony BMG roughly $6.5 million in return fees and manufacturing costs.67 
Although the twenty million MediaMax discs it distributed were never of-
ficially recalled,68 Sony BMG ceased production of MediaMax discs in 
December of 2005.69 Various state Attorneys General negotiated the de-
struction of the remaining stock of MediaMax CDs at Sony BMG’s ex-
pense.70 In addition, Sony BMG’s subsequent settlement with the FTC es-
tablished an incentive program to prompt retailers to return any remaining 
discs.71  
Not surprisingly, Sony BMG artists and their management lashed out 
at the label for its use of these protection measures.72 Even before news of 
the rootkit broke, artists expressed their frustration with protected CDs, 
which among other things, prevented fans from transferring music to their 
iPods.73 In a message to fans, Tim Foreman, of Sony BMG band Switch-
foot, wrote,  
We were horrified when we first heard about the new copy-
protection policy that is being implemented by most major labels 
. . . and immediately looked into all of our options for removing 
this from our new album . . . . It is heartbreaking to see our 
blood, sweat, and tears over the past 2 years blurred by the con-
fusion and frustration surrounding this new technology.”74  
This dissatisfaction only grew once artists and fans learned of the dan-
gers posed by these technologies. The manager for Sony BMG artist Trey 
Anastasio, whose November 1 album release was marred by the inclusion 
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of XCP, called the incident “a complete fiasco that will impact the entire 
industry,” and an “inexcusable blunder on the labels’ part.”75 Another 
Sony BMG artist, My Morning Jacket, not only provided instructions on 
its website that enabled fans to bypass the MediaMax software on the 
band’s album Z, but also sent over one hundred burned copies of the al-
bum to fans dissatisfied with the DRM.76 In a New York Times Op-Ed, 
Damian Kulash, of the band OK Go, who narrowly avoided the inclusion 
of DRM on their EMI release Oh No in part because of the band’s protes-
tations, described copy protection software as “at best a nuisance, and at 
worst a security threat.”77 
The outcry from fans, artists, and consumer advocates alike gave rise 
to a palpable shift in the public perception of Sony BMG and its parent 
corporations.78 Online petitioners called for a boycott of not only protected 
Sony BMG CDs, but Sony products generally.79 In the fallout of the root-
kit incident, one leading technology media outlet ranked Sony BMG’s 
protected discs fifth in its list of the worst technology products in his-
tory.80 The incident earned Sony BMG further distinction by being named 
one of the top ten “dumbest moments in business” for 2005.81 Although 
the financial impact of this public relations disaster is difficult to estimate, 
Sony BMG remains, in the eyes of many consumers, inextricably associ-
ated with its misguided attempts at content protection. 
B. Externalities Arising from the Rootkit Incident 
Aside from its impact on Sony BMG and its customers, the rootkit in-
cident inflicted broadly dispersed costs on individuals and institutions oth-
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erwise unconnected to Sony BMG’s DRM strategy. First, the insecurity 
introduced into individual computers led to network-wide vulnerabilities. 
Second, the rootkit incident undermined consumer acceptance of digital 
rights management technology. The first of these externalities foisted the 
costs of network insecurity onto the public, while the second decreased the 
value and viability of DRM strategies and forced Sony BMG’s partners 
and competitors within the content protection industry to rethink their 
practices.82  
Because of the distributed nature of the information infrastructure, 
overall network security is, in part, a function of the security of the mil-
lions of private and personal computers that comprise it.83 As a result, at-
tacks on individual computers endanger, by extension, the network itself. 
Improving and maintaining the security of our collective information in-
frastructure is an established national priority84—a national priority di-
rectly threatened by Sony BMG’s DRM. 
These network vulnerabilities could manifest themselves in a number 
of ways. First, XCP-infected machines could be exploited by attackers to 
penetrate otherwise secure corporate, university, government, or military 
networks. In the weeks following the public announcement of the rootkit, 
the number of networks containing at least one installation of XCP topped 
half a million.85 These networks suffered an increased risk of attack, leav-
ing the sensitive data they stored subject to theft or tampering.  
Second, computers infected with Sony BMG’s DRM could serve as 
launching points for attacks on third party machines. An attacker could 
utilize the vulnerabilities created by these DRM systems to enlist thou-
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sands of machines, unbeknownst to their owners, into massive botnets86—
armies of so called “zombie” computers—which are directed to relay 
spam or conduct crippling distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks.87 
Past DDOS targets have included corporations and national security as-
sets, including the infrastructure of the internet itself.88 Zombies may also 
be used to relay anonymous messages and hide the activities and commu-
nications of criminal and terrorist organizations from law enforcement.89 
Whether through direct access to protected networks or through dis-
tributed attacks, Sony BMG’s DRM threatened the basic operation of 
critical services that rely on the network infrastructure, among them, fi-
nancial, communications, and disaster response services. The worst-case 
scenarios of rootkit-enabled attacks were nothing short of catastrophic. 
Although these potential outcomes may smack of doomsday prognostica-
tion, the Department of Homeland Security took note of the public threat 
posed by Sony BMG’s DRM, cautioning that the XCP rootkit or similarly 
misguided attempts to control copyrighted works could interfere with the 
response to public health crises by compromising the security of the in-
formation infrastructure.90 
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Aside from the social cost of decreased security of the information in-
frastructure, the rootkit incident resulted in a second externality. By dra-
matically increasing public awareness of the restrictions on access and 
copying imposed by DRM technologies, while simultaneously corroding 
consumer confidence in their safety, the rootkit incident likely undermined 
the significant investments of both content providers and protection meas-
ure vendors in such technology. In the wake of the rootkit fiasco, major 
labels abandoned the use of DRM on CDs,91 and leading protection meas-
ure vendors ceased development of new CD-based DRM systems.92 But 
unlike the collective costs to security imposed by the rootkit incident, the 
reduced viability of DRM in the consumer music market may well repre-
sent a positive externality, rather than a negative one. To the extent the 
constraints and risk DRM imposed on consumers outweighed any benefits 
they conferred on copyright owners and the public, the reduction of DRM 
in the consumer marketplace could increase overall utility. 
The impact of the rootkit incident has extended beyond the CD market, 
coloring consumer perception of the desirability of DRM and forcing 
copyright owners and technology companies to rethink their content pro-
tection strategies. DRM, of course, faced criticism long before the rootkit 
                                                                                                                         
land Security, warned copyright holders against overly aggressive efforts to protect copy-
righted material: 
I wanted to raise one point of caution as we go forward, because we are 
also responsible for maintaining the security of the information infra-
structure of the United States and making sure peoples’ [and] busi-
nesses’ computers are secure. . . . There’s been a lot of publicity re-
cently about tactics used in pursuing protection for . . . CDs in which 
questions have been raised about whether the protection measures in-
stall hidden files on peoples’ computers that even the system adminis-
trators can’t find. It’s very important to remember that it’s your intel-
lectual property; it’s not your computer. And in the pursuit of protec-
tion of intellectual property, it’s important not to defeat or undermine 
the security measures that people need to adopt in these days. 
Id.; Brian Krebs, DHS Official Weighs In on Sony, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 11, 
2005, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/11/dhs_official_weighs_in_on_-
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 91. Robert Thompson & Tom Ferguson, Copy-Protection Curtailed, BILLBOARD, 
Dec. 16, 2006, at 27 (“EMI Music Group has dropped copy-protection technology from 
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incident.93 But after the general public became more attuned to the pres-
ence and effects of DRM, in part through the debate sparked by the XCP 
rootkit, these criticisms came from not only consumer advocates, but from 
leading technology companies with intimate ties to the music industry as 
well. In December of 2005, Bill Gates decried the lack of “simplicity and 
interoperability” of the DRM technologies protecting music downloads.94 
Others like Yahoo! Music chief David Goldberg urged the industry to 
drop DRM on downloads.95 These early critiques of DRM led the music 
industry to implement limited experiments in legitimate DRM-free 
downloads.96 
These experimental DRM-free releases gave way to calls for more 
fundamental changes. In February of 2007, Apple CEO Steve Jobs pub-
lished an open letter in which he called for the major record labels to 
“abolish DRM[] entirely.”97 Less than a month later, EMI and Apple an-
nounced that EMI’s entire digital catalog would be available without 
DRM on iTunes and through other retailers.98 During the joint Apple/EMI 
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press conference, Jobs noted the rootkit as an example of the failure of 
CD-based DRM.99 Other digital music retailers, including Microsoft, fol-
lowed suit and agreed to provide DRM-free EMI music.100  
Obviously, the fear of rootkit-like security vulnerabilities was not the 
sole, or even primary, impetus for this shift in the market for digital music 
downloads. But the rootkit incident contributed to the creation of an envi-
ronment amenable to this change in the prevailing wisdom among record 
labels and their online content distributors. The rootkit incident thrust the 
negative implications of DRM into the public consciousness on a broader 
scope than had previous rounds of criticism. These implications included 
not only the privacy and security interests directly at stake in the rootkit 
incident, but also more general concerns over restrictions on noninfringing 
uses, portability, and platform independence. As a validation of the long-
standing and frequently marginalized critiques of DRM, the rootkit inci-
dent made it more difficult for these criticisms to be dismissed out of 
hand. If the rest of the music industry follows EMI in its march away from 
DRM, the rootkit incident may prove, in retrospect, to have been a major 
strategic turning point.  
But even copyright holders that continue to insist upon DRM recog-
nize its public relations pitfalls in the current marketplace. In a transparent 
effort to divert attention away from the restrictions placed on users by 
technological protection measures, some have called for a shift in termi-
nology, dropping “Digital Rights Management”—a term once thought 
consumer-friendly—and replacing it with the euphemistic “Digital Con-
                                                                                                                         
The Good, The Bad & The Queen, by the innominate EMI band, was made available im-
mediately. The remainder of the EMI catalog was scheduled for DRM-free release on 
iTunes in May of 2007. 
 99. Eric Nicoli, CEO, EMI Group & Steve Jobs, CEO, Apple, Q&A at EMI Press 
Conference (Apr. 2, 2007), audio available at http://w3.cantos.com/07/pjxrobbi-703-
5zvx0/interviews.php?task=view; Jobs Talks New iTunes Functions, DRM and Video, 
iPod Storage, APPLEINSIDER, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/07/04/-
02/jobs_talks_new_itunes_functions_drm_and_video_ipod_storage_transcript.html. Ap-
ple’s position was likely influenced, at least in part, by growing international opposition 
to its iTunes DRM.  See Apple DRM illegal in Norway: Ombudsman, The Register, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/24/apple_drm_illegal_in_norway/?TB_iframe=true
&height=650&width=950 (Jan. 24, 2007); Thomas Crampton, iTunes legal attacks 
spread from France, International Herald Tribune, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/-
08/business/apple.php (June 9, 2006). 
 100. See, e.g., Elizabeth Montalbano, Microsoft Will Sell DRM-free Songs, PC 
WORLD, Apr. 6, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,130472/article.html. 
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sumer Enablement.”101 Whether substantive changes in current business 
models prevail or the industry instead adopts cosmetic fixes, the market 
for DRM has undergone an important shift, in part as the result of the 
rootkit incident. 
The harms that resulted from the rootkit incident affected all parties to 
the sale and licensing of protected Sony BMG CDs. Customers received a 
product tainted by reduced functionality, undisclosed invasions of privacy, 
and increased vulnerability to security breaches. Sony BMG and its artists 
hardly benefited from this deal, suffering both financial and reputational 
repercussions. The externalities that flowed from the rootkit incident un-
dermined collective investments in network security and DRM technology 
for parties entirely removed from Sony BMG and its ill-designed protec-
tion measures. In the end, it appears safe to conclude that no one’s best 
interest—especially not that of Sony BMG—was served by the distribu-
tion of XCP and MediaMax. The next Part attempts to surmise what mar-
ket considerations could have convinced Sony BMG that the distribution 
of these protection measures was a reasonable, self-interested decision. 
III. MARKET INFLUENCES  
Failures of software developers to adequately safeguard the security of 
their users’ systems and information come as no shock to those familiar 
with the state of computer security. The values and incentives that give 
rise to these failures are well documented.102 Users frequently undervalue 
their own privacy and security,103 and even those who claim to place a 
high value on these interests often act inconsistently with those values.104 
Because increased security provides little or no competitive advantage 
through product differentiation, firms recognize that the significant in-
vestments in time and resources needed to identify and eliminate the bugs 
that create insecurity will not be recouped.105 As a result, firms systemati-
cally under-invest in software security and fail to eliminate vulnerabilities. 
                                                                                                                         
 101. Glen Dickson, NCTA: HBO’s Zitter Says DRM Is Misnomer, BROADCASTING & 
CABLE, May 9, 2007, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6440876.html. 
 102. See Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of Information Security, 314 
SCIENCE 610 (2006), available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~twm29/science-econ.pdf. 
 103. See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individ-
ual Decision Making, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 26. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See Bill Thompson, Taking Computer Insecurity Seriously, BBC NEWS, Sept. 
17, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/technology/3666702.stm; Jeordan Legon, As Net 
Attack Eases, Blame Game Surges, CNN.COM, Jan. 28, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/-
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However, these incentives to under-invest in security cannot fully ex-
plain the Sony BMG rootkit incident. Typically, software vulnerabilities 
result from a developer’s failure to remove incidental and unintended in-
firmities in its code. But the rootkit incident in large part resulted from the 
intentional introduction of components and functionality that undermined 
user security and privacy in the service of content protection.106 From the 
perspective of protection measure developers and content owners, these 
security and privacy flaws served as features rather than bugs.107 In this 
sense, the motivations underlying the rootkit incident share some common 
features with those that spur the development of spyware. Because it dif-
fers so fundamentally from the longstanding understanding of how inse-
cure software makes its way to market, the Sony BMG rootkit incident 
raises new questions about the incentives to protect or subvert user secu-
rity and privacy in the context of DRM technology. 
This Part examines two basic sets of market-based explanations of 
Sony BMG’s decision-making process. The first considers possible fail-
ures to grasp the likely impact of its technology, and suggests systematic 
inadequacies in Sony BMG’s review of the DRM systems it licenses. The 
second countenances more informed and, consequently, more deliberate 
cost-benefit calculations that could encourage the use of cloaking tech-
nologies and inadequate disclosures. Ultimately, although we conclude 
that this second set of explanations is the more plausible, both likely con-
tributed, to varying degrees, to the release of these protection measures. 
A. The Rootkit Incident as Mistake  
Imperfect information and bounded rationality offer perhaps the most 
charitable explanations of Sony BMG’s decision to distribute XCP and 
MediaMax. Given the resources and sophistication of Sony BMG, this ex-
                                                                                                                         
TECH/internet/01/27/worm.why/; Brendan I. Koerner, Ain’t No Network Strong Enough, 
SALON.COM, Aug. 31, 2000, http://archive.salon.com/tech/review/2000/08/31/schneier/; 
Mindy Blodgett, Is Your Business as Safe as You Think?, CNN.COM, July 16, 1999, 
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9907/16/security-ent.idg/index.html. 
 106. Some of the risks created as a result of the rootkit incident were the result of 
failures to eliminate bugs rather than the intentional introduction of risk. This more tradi-
tional narrative, for example, explains the flaws in the uninstaller tools and patches re-
leased after the disclosure of the harms of XCP and MediaMax. MediaMax’s privilege 
escalation vulnerability likewise can be explained without implying any harmful intent on 
the part of its developers. 
 107. As Professor Felten has explained, these vulnerabilities are “caused not by any 
flaws in [the] execution of their copy protection plan, but from the nature of the plan it-
self.” Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/-
?p=934 (Nov. 22, 2005, 03:51 EST). 
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planation seems at best incomplete. But even if Sony BMG lacked critical 
information about the dangers posed by its protection measures or miscal-
culated their likelihood and severity, its decision points to a culpable fail-
ure of internal procedures to safeguard against the wide-scale distribution 
of flawed protection measures. 
A good-faith mistake on the part of Sony BMG could have arisen in 
two ways. First, Sony BMG could have been unaware of the objectionable 
features of its DRM—at least those not directly related to the constraints 
placed on accessing and copying music. Second, Sony BMG could have 
been misinformed or misled about the dangers posed by the various com-
ponents of its protection measures.  
Both of these explanations depend on a lack of adequate pre-release 
security reviews of protection measures. Sony BMG has offered no public 
indication that any pre-release security review occurred. Assuming Sony 
BMG did not intentionally distribute software with knowledge of the dan-
gers it posed, any such review must have failed to identify the threats in-
herent in XCP and MediaMax. It is unlikely that Sony BMG lacked suffi-
cient in-house security expertise to meaningfully examine the functionality 
of the protection measures it licensed. Given that Sony Corporation of 
America, whose holdings include Sony Electronics and Sony Computer 
Entertainment America, controls a 50% interest in Sony BMG, more than 
adequate technical analysis was within reach. Moreover, external security 
review of new DRM schemes is common within the music industry. And 
as demonstrated by the research of F-Secure108 and Mark Russinovich,109 
as well as by the analysis of Ed Felten and J. Alex Halderman,110 trained 
security professionals could have easily identified the security risks posed 
by these protection measures. 
Aside from a disregard for user security,111 another explanation for the 
lack of meaningful security review is overconfidence in the protection 
measure vendors who provided these technologies. In retrospect, any such 
confidence was obviously misplaced. But even without the benefit of 
hindsight, Sony BMG had good reason to subject its vendors’ products to 
scrutiny. Prior to inking the deal to provide XCP to Sony BMG, 
First4Internet’s business focused on content filtering, particularly the 
                                                                                                                         
 108. See Hamm, supra note 13. 
 109. See Mark’s Blog, supra note 8 (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 PST). 
 110. See Halderman & Felten, supra note 11. 
 111. As discussed infra in Section III.B, an undervaluing of user security and privacy 
could explain Sony BMG’s decision. 
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automated recognition of pornographic images.112 Aside from an earlier 
revision on XCP used by a number of labels on a smattering of pre-release 
CDs,113 First4Internet had no apparent expertise or experience in content 
protection software.  
SunnComm, the company that delivered MediaMax, offered even 
more cause for concern. The company began as a provider of Elvis imper-
sonation services.114 After a change in management following a false press 
release announcing a non-existent $25 million production deal with War-
ner Brothers,115 the company purchased a 3.5” floppy disk factory in 2001, 
displaying a disturbing dearth of technological savvy.116 After two em-
ployees announced their intention to leave the fledgling company to de-
velop copy protection software, SunnComm convinced the pair to lead a 
new division, leaving both Elvis and floppy discs behind in order to de-
velop what would become MediaMax.117  
Sony BMG—perhaps realizing too late its misplaced trust in 
SunnComm, or perhaps simply hoping to recoup some of its financial and 
public relations losses—filed a lawsuit against the Amergence Group (a 
re-branded SunnComm)118 in July of 2007. Sony BMG’s claims include 
                                                                                                                         
 112. See First 4 Internet Powers New Anti-Porn Solutions at Europe’s Biggest Secu-
rity Show; Major New Products from PixAlert, Pure Content and Green Technology 
Meet Growing Corporate Need to Filter Pornography, TMCNET, Apr. 20, 2005, 
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2005/apr/1136356.htm. After the rootkit incident, 
First4Internet continued to do business under the name Fortium Technologies. See Robert 
Lemos, Sony BMG Sues Copy-protection Maker, SECURITYFOCUS, July 13, 2007, 
http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/547. 
 113. See Sion Barry, Controlling Illicit Internet Content Drives F4I Success, 
ICWALES, June 15, 2005, http://icwales.icnetwork.co.uk/0300business/0100news/tm_-
objectid=15631868&method=full&siteid=50082-name_page.html. 
 114. Ashlee Vance, Is SunnComm a Sham or the Next, Big DRM Success?, THE REG-
ISTER, Sept. 27, 2004, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/27/sunncomm_death_or_-
glorry/print.html. 
 115. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Paloma (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/-
complr17462.htm. 
 116. SunnComm purchased the floppy drive company, which was formerly a failed 
oil and gas company, in part to avoid SEC scrutiny by merging with a fully reporting 
company. See Vance, supra note 114.  
 117. Id.  
 118. SunnComm, too, underwent something of a re-branding after the rootkit inci-
dent, rechristening itself the Amergence Group. Press Release, The Amergence Group, 
SunnComm Establishes New Subsidiary—The Amergence Group (Jan. 26, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.amergencegroup.com/news/amergingnews.asp?grammid=200701261-
030. 
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negligence and breach of contract, alleging that MediaMax was defective 
and failed to satisfy SunnComm’s warranty.119 The Amergence Group 
contends that Sony BMG retained “final authority” over the functional 
specifications of MediaMax, and that SunnComm simply delivered the 
product demanded by Sony BMG.120 This litigation, as it proceeds, may 
well reveal the extent of Sony BMG’s knowledge of the objectionable fea-
tures of its DRM. 
Until such information is available, Sony BMG’s sophistication121 and 
access to both internal and external resources offer good reasons to ques-
tion the likelihood that it was in the dark as to the existence of the dangers 
posed by the rootkit and the other objectionable features of XCP and Me-
diaMax. Even assuming Sony BMG was oblivious as to the details of its 
DRM, the failure to act expeditiously once notified by F-Secure of the 
rootkit and its dangers suggests that a lack of knowledge alone fails to 
fully explain Sony BMG’s actions. In any case, to the extent that igno-
rance of the functionality and likely effects of its DRM influenced Sony 
BMG’s decision-making, its failure to independently review these tech-
nologies evinces an undervaluation of the documented potential effects of 
DRM on user security and privacy. 
B. The Rootkit Incident as Calculated Risk 
Since characterizations of the rootkit incident as the result of a good-
faith mistake by Sony BMG fail to fully account for its internal decision-
making, explanations that presume some degree of knowledge present 
more plausible scenarios. Understanding why Sony BMG would know-
ingly distribute protection measures that carried the risks associated with 
XCP and MediaMax requires consideration of the relative value proposi-
tions presented by CD-based DRM to content owners and customers. Al-
though DRM, in theory, offers copyright holders some benefit from re-
duced copying, consumers generally see DRM as a poor bargain since it 
requires them to pay the same price for a product with diminished func-
                                                                                                                         
 119. See Summons Notice, Sony BMG Entm’t v. Amergence Group, No. 602201-
2007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (on file with authors). 
 120. Press Release, The Amergence Group, Sony-BMG Files Suit Against Amer-
gence Group (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release.do?-
id=750315. 
 121. Sony, along with Philips, owns the rights to the core DRM patents of Intertrust. 
In theory, at least, Sony BMG could have implemented a suite of better technical solu-
tions. See Press Release, Sony Corporation of America, Philips and Sony Lead Acquisi-
tion of Intertrust, available at http://www.sony.com/SCA/press/021113.shtml (Nov. 13, 
2002). 
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tionality. Underhanded tactics such as those used by Sony BMG offer one 
way to overcome this skepticism, although this story should counsel 
against their future use.  
Although the precise amounts are uncertain, the music industry loses 
revenues each year as a result of copyright infringement.122 Songs copied 
on peer-to-peer networks, BitTorrent, and other lesser-known corners of 
the darknet contribute to these losses, as does large-scale CD piracy and 
the casual physical copying of CDs by everyday consumers.123 DRM is 
intended to serve as a partial solution to the widespread infringement of 
music industry copyrights, but, as the industry is likely aware, CD-based 
DRM cannot hope to address two of these three sources of infringement. 
Since only a single unrestricted copy of a particular track is necessary to 
rapidly populate peer-to-peer and other networked methods of file transfer, 
measures like XCP and MediaMax are all but worthless when it comes to 
preventing infringement on the internet.124 And protection measures that 
can be easily thwarted125 pose no genuine hurdles for the sophisticated, 
large-scale commercial pirates that press upwards of one billion counter-
feit CDs each year.126  
The value of CD-based DRM like XCP and MediaMax, therefore, 
flows from its ability to prevent the casual schoolyard trading of burned 
CDs and other varieties of personal copying. The precise scope of finan-
cial harm caused by such purported infringement is unclear.127 Nor does 
                                                                                                                         
 122. RIAA, Piracy: Online and on the Street, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.-
php?content_selector=piracy_details_online (last visited July 30, 2007). 
 123. Id. See also Peter Biddle & Paul England, The Darknet and the Future of Con-
tent Distribution, ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV., Oct. 2001, at 140, avail-
able at http://msl1.mit.edu/ESD10/docs/darknet5.pdf (describing the darknet as “a collec-
tion of networks and technologies used to share digital content [and] an application and 
protocol layer riding on existing networks” and citing as examples of darknets “peer-to-
peer file sharing, CD and DVD copying, and key or password sharing on email and news-
groups.”).  
 124. See Halderman & Felten, supra note 11, at 2. 
 125. As discussed infra in the text accompanying note 179, MediaMax can be de-
feated by simply holding down a computer’s shift key. Earlier DRM systems could be 
circumvented using just adhesive tape or a felt tip pen. HALDERMAN, supra note 4, at 4, 
5. 
 126. Pirate CD Sales Top 1 Billion, CNN.COM, July 10, 2003, http://edition.cnn.-
com/2003/BUSINESS/07/10/music.piracy/; Pirate CD Sales Hit Record High, BBC 
NEWS, July 22, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3916681.stm.  
 127. Industry research indicates that such “social sharing” accounts for as much as 
37% of music acquisition by volume. NPD GROUP, NARM/NPD 2007, PHASE ONE, CON-
SUMERS & MUSIC DISCOVERY 4 (2007), available at http://www.digitalmusicnews.-
com/research/npd_presentation_narm. However, as with earlier projections of harm aris-
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any available evidence reveal the effectiveness of these measures in limit-
ing such activity. Perhaps in recognition of the tenuous argument for the 
utility of these measures, even on this single front of the war against in-
fringement, the music industry is quick to downplay its expectations for 
CD-based DRM, typically referring to these protection measures as mere 
“speed bumps” or inconveniences intended to keep honest customers hon-
est.128 But given their rudimentary design, these protection measures dis-
proportionately affect those customers with the least knowledge of the op-
erations of their computers, precisely those reasonably expected to pose 
the least threat of infringement. From the content owners’ own perspec-
tive, these protection measures offer only marginal value, and even this 
valuation may be the result of overestimates of the effectiveness of CD-
based DRM. 
If the value of CD-based DRM to content owners is low, albeit posi-
tive, the value of these protection measures to customers is almost unques-
tionably negative. Even at the time of the rootkit incident, the overwhelm-
ing majority of CDs were sold without DRM;129 customers were, as a 
technological matter, free to copy songs from these discs to their hard 
drives, transfer them to iPods, burn them to CDs, and listen to them using 
the software of their choice.130 XCP and MediaMax altered long-standing 
consumer expectations131 by placing technological and contractual limits 
on customers’ ability to use their CDs in the manner to which they were 
accustomed.  
                                                                                                                         
ing from peer-to-peer downloads, estimates of the relative proportion of these burned and 
ripped copies that translate to lost sales would likely vary significantly.  
 128. Sony spokesman Nathaniel Brown characterized SunnComm’s first copy protec-
tion scheme in the following manner after J. Alex Halderman reported that it was easily 
disabled: “Copy management is intended as a speed bump, intended to thwart the casual 
listener from mass burning and uploading. We made a conscious decision to err on the 
side of playability and flexibility.” John Borland, Shift Key Breaks CD Copy Locks, 
CNET NEWS.COM, Oct, 7, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-5087875.html. 
 129. In 2005, over 600 million CDs were sold in the United States. See US CD Album 
Sales Show 7% Slide, BBC NEWS, Dec. 29, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/-
entertainment/4566186.stm. Of those, the millions of CDs protected by XCP and Me-
diaMax represented only a small percentage. 
 130. See infra notes 132-136. 
 131. Consumer expectations flow from prior experience with similar objects and in-
formation. These experiences are in turn a result of the capacity of the technology, laws, 
norms, and markets. Consumer expectations of interacting with DVDs today reveals how 
these forces can come together in ways that create expectations different from those 
which prevailed during the CD era. 
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Empirical research has cataloged the deep-seated expectations of con-
sumers with respect to their interaction with digital music. In a study con-
ducted in the European Union, consumers indicated uniform and strong 
beliefs in their right to move digital music between devices.132 Similarly, 
individuals shared a strong conviction that copying for their own purposes 
is legal,133 and a high percentage of the survey population had burned their 
own music mixes in the prior six months.134 While survey participants’ 
belief in the legality of “sharing” music was less strong and consistent,135 
they reported a significant amount of sharing with family and friends.136  
These consumer expectations are firmly rooted in the pre-digital pat-
terns of consumption and use of recorded music. Concerns over private 
copying enabled by new technologies are, of course, nothing new. Nearly 
every advance in the recording and distribution of music has sparked near 
hysteria from then-dominant rights holders. Music publishers balked at the 
player piano,137 the phonograph138 and radio of both the terrestrial139 and 
internet140 varieties. And long before the music industry feared peer-to-
peer infringement, reel-to-reel copying led the industry to infamously pro-
claim that “Home Taping is Killing Music.”141 The concerns that motivate 
                                                                                                                         
 132. According to the study, 81% of those surveyed thought it legal to play a pur-
chased file on different devices. NICOLE DUFFT ET AL., INDICARE, DIGITAL MUSIC US-
AGE AND DRM: RESULTS FROM AN EUROPEAN CONSUMER SURVEY 42 (2005), available 
at http://www.indicare.org/tiki-download_file.php?fileId=110. 
 133. In the study, 73% of users surveyed thought it was legal to make a copy of a CD 
or file which they had bought for themselves, for their own use. Id. 
 134. Of all digital music users surveyed, 80% had burned their own mixes to CD over 
the past 6 months, 39% had done so several times per month or more often. The share of 
teens that burn their own CDs several times per month or more often is 46%, compared to 
34% of the 40+ group. Id. at 16. In Germany, almost 90% of the digital music users like 
to burn their own mixes on CD compared to “only” 75% in the UK. Id. at 18 tbl. 3.2. 
 135. Id. at 42. 
 136. More than three quarters of digital music users have shared music files with 
their family members and friends over the past 6 months; 60% have shared music files 
with other people. Again, teens are the most active music file sharers; about half of them 
share music files with friends and family several times per month or more often.  
Id. at 16. 
 137. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 55-56 (2004), available 
at http://www.-jus.uio.no/sisu/free_culture.lawrence_lessig/portrait.pdf. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 58-59. 
 140. See id. at 195-99.  
 141. Neil Strauss, THE POP LIFE; 2 Big Forces Converging To Change the Sale of 
Music, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at E1. 
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DRM are simply a continuation of this pattern of hostility to disruptive 
technologies.  
Although engineering constraints have historically limited the copying 
of music, digital works are trivially copied without any loss of quality. In 
part driven by the lack of practical constraints on digital copying, DRM 
proactively introduces technological hurdles that exceed those available to 
earlier generations of copyright holders, displacing the traditionally porous 
enforcement of copyright with limits embedded in and enforced by soft-
ware code.142 In contrast, previous mechanisms for addressing infringe-
ment intruded less far less on the consumer’s experience of the purchased 
music. For example, the Serial Copy Management System, which con-
trolled downstream copying of the ill-fated Digital Audio Tape format, did 
not impede the use of the original tape or even the recording of first-
generation copies.143 DRM, on the other hand, frequently constrains the 
portability of music by tethering it to particular devices or platforms. Con-
sumers are limited in their ability to experience the music on their own 
terms, in the time, place, and even sequence of their choice. Their ability 
to copy, share, and recode content is likewise constrained in a manner that 
offends many users’ perceptions of fairness, if not law.  
The constraints imposed by DRM generally reduce the value to con-
sumers of protected content. Information goods typically increase in value 
as the number and extent of their possible uses increase.144 With respect to 
DRM, consumers will, in principle, pay more for goods with liberal usage 
rules. In addition, more consumers can be expected to purchase such 
goods.145 Consumers regard media with very limited uses as the equivalent 
of damaged goods146 and will pay less for them, if they are willing to pur-
chase them at all.147 In short, CD-based DRM renders the protected discs 
                                                                                                                         
 142. See Radin, Margaret Jane, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 
J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 142, 151-153 (2004); see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).   
 143. See Digital Audio Recording Devices and Media Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001-1010 (2000). 
 144. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE 
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 97-102 (1998). 
 145. This principle is borne out by the INDICARE survey results, which indicate that 
people are willing to pay substantially more for digital music with more functionality. See 
DUFFT ET AL., supra note 132, at 25. 
 146. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 144.  
 147. See NATALI HELBERGER ET AL., FIRST UPDATE OF THE STATE-OF-THE-ART RE-
PORT: DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND CONSUMER ACCEPTABILITY: A MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY DISCUSSION OF CONSUMER CONCERNS AND EXPECTATIONS 33-34 (2005), 
available at http://www.indicare.org/tiki-download_file.php?fileId=111. 
1186 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1157 
less valuable to consumers. Yet this reduction in functionality is not coun-
terbalanced by any proportionate decrease in cost. DRM-protected CDs 
are sold at roughly the same price as standard non-protected CDs.148 Some 
protected CDs include bonus features like music videos or interactive art-
ist biographies, but for most consumers these features were likely insuffi-
cient to compensate for the reduction in basic functionality of the pro-
tected discs. 
Another factor in choosing to surreptitiously deploy DRM, beyond 
skirting consumer resentment, was that Sony BMG likely underestimated 
the public reaction to the security and privacy threats created by its DRM. 
Both research and market history have demonstrated that many users are 
willing to trade security and privacy for ease of use, desired functionality, 
or even small sums of money.149 These results could lead a firm to place 
minimal value on user security and privacy in its risk calculus. In the root-
kit incident, these assumptions proved incorrect. Consumers, it would ap-
pear, care enough about privacy and security to want to make the decision 
about when and whether to trade it away for themselves. In part, the strong 
reaction to these faulty protection measures could stem from deeply in-
grained expectations about our experience of music. In contrast to brows-
ing the internet or downloading software, consumers consider the playing 
of a CD to be a private and passive act and one that carries no risk of at-
tack from the outside world. When security and privacy threats intruded 
upon this zone of safety, consumers reacted with unexpectedly intense in-
dignation. The particularly strong reaction may also have stemmed from 
the lack of any perceptible fair trade-off between the benefits gained by 
consumers and the risks they faced. A user who downloads a free game or 
screensaver from the internet may suspect a risk of unwanted adware, but 
justifies that risk by the benefit of a free program. Here customers paid the 
expected price, and not only received less than they bargained for in terms 
                                                                                                                         
 148. Id. at 28, 33. 
 149. For an overview of surveys and experiments revealing divergence in consumers’ 
privacy attitudes from their behavior during transactions, see Alessandro Acquisti & Jens 
Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behaviors: Losses, Gains, and Hyperbolic 
Discounting, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 165 (L. Jean Camp & 
Stephen Lewis eds., 2004). For specific examples of this phenomena, see Sarah Spieker-
mann, Jens Grossklags, & Bettina Berendt, E-privacy in 2nd Generation E-commerce: 
Privacy Preferences Versus Actual Behavior, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD ACM CON-
FERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 38-47 (2001) (discussing lab study finding incon-
sistencies between participants’ self-reported privacy concerns and behavior in online 
shopping experiences). 
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of CD functionality, but were also saddled with undisclosed privacy and 
security risks.  
XCP and MediaMax presented unique marketing challenges for Sony 
BMG. Since fully-informed customers were unlikely to pay full price for 
what they would view as an inferior product, Sony BMG faced a choice. It 
could either develop a product that included DRM but was nonetheless 
attractive to consumers—most likely by significantly reducing retail 
prices—or it could obfuscate the nature of the product it sold and prevent 
its customers from excising the unwanted DRM post-purchase. All evi-
dence suggests that Sony BMG adopted the latter approach. 
These same market conditions, however, existed for all major record 
labels, yet most of Sony BMG’s competitors were content to implement 
less invasive technological protection measures, knowing full well that 
they would fail to prevent infringement.150 The other major labels, unlike 
Sony, did not insist upon maximum effectiveness at the risk of harm to 
users.  
The history of Sony, one of the two parent companies of Sony BMG, 
in its attempts to restrict access to and copying of its content may offer 
some insight into why Sony BMG, unlike its competitors, accepted these 
risks in return for an uncertain and at best marginal increase in the effec-
tiveness of its DRM. The aggressive stance adopted by Sony in halting 
innovative consumer-driven uses of products like the Aibo robotic dog151 
and the Playstation152 suggest a willingness to seek maximum protection 
of Sony intellectual property, even at the risk of consumer alienation.  
                                                                                                                         
 150. See Jefferson Graham, CD Woes May Have Had Roots in Merger, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 18, 2005, at 1B. Some have suggested that shifts in management and massive staff 
cuts at Sony BMG may have contributed further to the breakdown that led to the release 
of XCP. See id. 
 151. The Aibo, which retailed for $1299, came preprogrammed with a limited set of 
functions. John G. Spooner, Sony Aibo to Spread More Puppy Love, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Oct. 10, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1040-961536.html. One enterprising Aibo 
owner and hobbyist decrypted the software code that defined the Aibo’s abilities and dis-
tributed new software to Aibo owners that “taught” the dogs to dance and speak, among 
other things. David Labrador, Teaching Robot Dogs New Tricks, SCIENTIFIC AMERI-
CAN.COM, Jan. 21, 2002, http://www.sciam.com/print_version.cfm?articleID=0005510C-
EABD-1CD6-B4A8809EC588EEDF. Despite the fact that the software was of use only 
to Aibo owners and arguably increased the product’s value, Sony demanded removal of 
the software, contending that decryption of the Aibo code violated the DMCA. Id. 
 152. When Connectix developed its Virtual Game Station, a software emulator that 
enabled owners of Sony PlayStation games to play titles on Apple computers, Sony filed 
a copyright infringement suit, alleging that Connectix, by reverse engineering Sony’s 
game console, infringed the copyright in the PlayStation BIOS. Sony Computer Entm’t 
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In light of this corporate heritage, the difficulty of convincing consum-
ers of the value of DRM-protected CDs, and its underestimation of public 
reaction to degraded security and privacy, Sony BMG’s decision to deploy 
XCP and MediaMax, its attempts to cloak its technology and its failures of 
disclosure emerge as explicable, if irresponsible, reactions to market con-
ditions. But while its motivations are apparent, the long-term strategic 
benefit of this approach is difficult to discern, especially with the benefit 
of hindsight. The limitations and strengths of both the CD and the personal 
computer as platforms for the dissemination and playback of content, 
which we examine next, constrained and enabled Sony BMG’s choices, 
further explaining, but not excusing, its actions. 
IV. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY 
The technological landscape encouraged Sony BMG’s decision to de-
ploy its DRM through stealth measures. The personal computer, in theory, 
allows users broad choice over the operating system and applications that 
run upon it. The universal nature of the PC sits in stark contrast to the sin-
gle-purpose devices historically used by individuals to enjoy music. This 
flexibility limits the control that Sony BMG and other copyright owners 
                                                                                                                         
Am., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2000). After the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court’s finding of infringement, id. at 609-10, Sony acquired all 
rights to the Virtual Game Station from Connectix and ceased development rather than 
allow consumers to access its games on a competitor’s platform. Phillip Michaels, Emu-
lation Sensation: Microsoft Buys Virtual PC from Connectix, MACWORLD, May 2003, at 
25, 25, available at 2003 WLNR 8626928. Sony also filed suit against Bleem, the manu-
facturer of a PC-based PlayStation emulator, claiming that by using screenshots of Sony 
games in its advertising, Bleem infringed Sony’s copyrights. The Ninth Circuit vacated 
the district court’s preliminary injunction, holding that Bleem’s use was likely fair. Sony 
Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000). 
After the release of the PlayStation 2, Sony brought suit against Gamemasters, the 
manufacturer of the Game Enhancer, a device that enabled PlayStation owners to play 
games from other countries by bypassing region code restrictions encoded on game discs. 
Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
Sony succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction on both contributory infringement 
and anti-trafficking theories, precluding U.S. customers from playing games legally pur-
chased in Asia and Europe. Id. at 989. 
In hopes of exerting further control over the video game aftermarket, Sony obtained 
a patent in connection with its latest video game console, the PlayStation 3, on a technol-
ogy that would tie each copy of a game to a single console, effectively eliminating the 
resale and rental market for PlayStation 3 games. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Furor Over 
Sony Patent: Technology That Could Prevent Resale of Games and Other Digital Goods 
Raises Speculation, Fears, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at C1. That technology has yet to 
be implemented. 
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can exert over the applications that will be used to access and copy their 
CDs. As a result of the inability to control the platform for content deliv-
ery, Sony BMG was encouraged to consider preemptively limiting poten-
tial infringement through the use of invasive software countermeasures. 
Further complicating efforts to control content, the music industry’s long-
time distribution medium of choice, the CD, is an unencrypted format. 
These inescapable features of the playback device and distribution me-
dium encouraged the adoption of invasive DRM techniques such as those 
employed by Sony BMG. 
Technology not only animated Sony BMG’s strategy, it also enabled 
it. Sony BMG likely banked on its ability to keep the existence and func-
tionality of its DRM relatively secret from the general public. The rootkit 
itself was designed to maintain secrecy, but equally importantly, the stan-
dard configuration of many personal computers allows third parties to sur-
reptitiously install code, including the DRM at issue here, without alerting 
the user or requiring affirmative steps to proceed with installation.  
A. Technology as Encouragement 
In conjunction, two features of the technological landscape encour-
aged, if not required, the use of intrusive technological protection meas-
ures such as those employed by Sony BMG. Given the combination of a 
general purpose, multifunctional networked playback device with an en-
trenched but unencrypted digital distribution medium, the music industry’s 
adoption of software-based technological protection measures seems, in 
hindsight, unavoidable.  
1. The PC as Playback Device 
From the perspective of many copyright holders, the PC is perhaps the 
least-desirable device imaginable for the playback of unprotected CDs. 
Unlike the single-purpose devices that consumers have traditionally used 
to listen to music, the PC is a general-purpose device, a machine with 
nearly unbounded functionality, limited primarily by the software running 
on it. As a result, PC users are able to not only listen to the music con-
tained on a CD, but to copy, transcode, edit, remix, and distribute it as 
well. 
Contrast this range of user freedoms with those permitted by analog 
playback devices like the phonograph—particularly in the days before 
reel-to-reel and cassette recorders—and modern digital playback devices, 
like the DVD player. Phonograph users, even well into the twentieth cen-
tury, were constrained in their ability to make copies of recordings by the 
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dictates of the state of the art—the equipment required to press phono-
graph records was simply not feasible for consumer use.  
While the limitations of early analog media were primarily the result 
of engineering hurdles that would be overcome by subsequent innovations, 
limitations on modern digital playback devices are largely the result of 
intentional design decisions targeted at curtailing the relative ease of digi-
tal copying. The functionality of DVD players, for example, is tightly con-
trolled by the DVD Copy Control Association (DVD CCA), the industry 
body that licenses the Content Scramble System (CSS) and holds the keys 
necessary to manufacture devices and software that legally play DVDs. 
Indeed both the DVD medium and its playback devices were designed 
from the ground up to permit increased control over consumer use of con-
tent. By insisting that CSS licensees conform to rigid specifications, con-
tent owners enjoy some increased assurance that devices that copy DVDs 
will not be appearing on store shelves any time soon. And when its licen-
sees offer product features that test the bounds of this control, the DVD 
CCA has brought suit to maintain its grip over the medium.153 
Unlike the DVD player, the personal computer was not developed with 
copy control and content protection in mind. Computer users are free to 
add or replace hardware, to substitute one operating system for another, 
and to install or uninstall software—or, if sufficiently skilled, to write their 
own. A system that permits this level of flexibility does not lend itself to 
the sort of control to which copyright holders aspire when designing play-
back devices. Any restriction imposed by software can be removed by 
software. As a result, skilled and determined users are capable of defeating 
any software-based content protection scheme deployed on a standard PC. 
In recognition of this fact, content owners have sought to embed pro-
tection measures at deeper levels of the machine’s architecture. The de-
velopment of trusted computing platforms was in essence an attempt to 
reinvent the PC in a manner that wrested control from the hands of users 
and entrusted it to hardware manufacturers, software developers, and con-
tent owners.154 While some touted this approach for its potential security 
                                                                                                                         
 153. Kaleidescape, the producer of a high-end home entertainment server that al-
lowed customers to store hundreds of DVDs on a networked device, prevailed in a law-
suit alleging that it violated the terms of its DVD CCA license. Transcript of Proceedings 
at 66, 67, 70, DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc., No. 1-04-CV031829 
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.kaleidescape.com/files/legal/-
DVDCCA-vs-Kaleidescape-Statement-of-Decision.pdf. 
 154. See Ross Anderson, Cryptography and Competition Policy—Issues with 
“Trusted Computing,” at 3-5, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/tcpa.pdf; see also 
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benefits, others suspected that DRM was the true driving force behind 
trusted computing.155 Microsoft’s Palladium, for example, was intended to 
take advantage of specially developed Intel hardware to integrate digital 
rights management into the CPU itself.156 By embedding features like re-
mote attestation,157 sealed storage,158 and memory curtaining159 into the 
trusted computing environment, this approach held some promise for con-
tent owners who hoped to exercise greater control over copyrighted mate-
rial on PCs. But despite widespread adoption of the Trusted Platform 
                                                                                                                         
Chad Woodford, Comment, Trusted Computing or Big Brother? Putting the Rights Back 
in Digital Rights Management, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 253 (2004). 
 155. See id. 
 156. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Microsoft Palladium - Next Generation 
Secure Computing Base, http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/microsoft/palladium.-
html (last updated Nov. 11, 2002). 
 157. Remote attestation is a process by which software authenticates itself to a re-
mote host. The user’s local machine would share information about its hardware and 
software configuration in order for a remote machine to determine whether it will be 
trusted. Vivek Haldar et al., Semantic Remote Attestation - A Virtual Machine Directed 
Approach to Trusted Computing, in USENIX ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD 
USENIX VIRTUAL MACHINE RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY SYMPOSIUM 29 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.usenix.org/events/vm04/tech/haldar/haldar.pdf. For example, users 
whose machines contained unauthorized software could be refused access by a remote 
website or service. 
 158. Sealed storage is a means by which the cryptographic keys necessary to access 
encrypted data are generated by authorized software rather than stored in the open on the 
user’s machine. This approach is meant to ensure that content cannot be accessed by un-
authorized software that could circumvent the limits imposed by authorized software. 
SETH SCHOEN, TRUSTED COMPUTING: PROMISE AND RISK (2003), http://www.eff.org/-
Infrastructure/trusted_computing/20031001_tc.pdf; Arnd Weber & Dirk A. Weber, Legal 
Risk Assessment of Trusted Computing. A Review, INDICARE MONITOR, Feb. 24, 2006, 
at 58, available at http://www.indicare.org/tiki-download_file.php?fileId=174. 
 159. Memory curtaining is a technique that prevents one application from accessing 
the memory used by another application, preventing, for example, unauthorized programs 
from capturing content being played by an authorized program that enforces restrictions 
on use of that content. SCHOEN, supra note 158; see also Mike Burmester & Judie Mul-
holland, The Advent of Trusted Computing: Implications for Digital Forensics, in ACM 
ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2006 SYMPOSIUM ON APPLIED COMPUTING 283 (2006), 
available at http://www.cs.fsu.edu/~burmeste/tc.pdf. There are stronger methods for iso-
lating memory and resources.  Andrew Whitaker, Marianne Shaw, and Steven D. Grib-
ble, Scale and Performance in the Denali Isolation Kernel, ACM SIGOPS OPERATING 
SYS. REV, Winter 2002, at 195, available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid= 
844128.844147. 
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Module specifications,160 trusted computing has yet to yield any radical 
transformation of the computing environment. 
2. The Lack of an Encrypted Format  
For the majority of its nearly 30-year history, the Compact Disc for-
mat, first developed in the late 1970s by Philips and Sony, has enabled 
consumers to freely access and copy CD content.161 The CD, unlike later-
developed digital formats like the DVD,162 includes no content encryp-
tion.163 Digital audio tracks on CDs can be read and copied by any com-
patible hardware, even in the absence of any cryptographic key. But by the 
late 1990s, after recordable CD media and hardware became common-
place and use of peer-to-peer networks became widespread, copyright 
holders sought to exercise greater control over the post-sale use of CDs. 
Given the massive user base of the CD and the investments of both con-
tent owners and consumer electronics manufacturers in the format, record 
labels faced a difficult task. They needed to devise methods to prevent 
unwanted PC-based copying while simultaneously maintaining usability 
on standard audio equipment. This required grafting protection measures 
onto a preexisting unencrypted format while retaining backwards com-
patibility. 
Two general approaches to this problem emerged and can be broadly 
categorized as either passive or active. Passive protection measures rely on 
changes to the structure and data contained on the CD to prevent copy-
ing.164 Active protection measures, like XCP and MediaMax, on the other 
hand, rely on the installation of software on the user’s computer to inter-
fere with the accessing and copying of audio files.165 
                                                                                                                         
 160. For details on the Trusted Platform Module specifications, see Trusted Comput-
ing Group, Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Specifications, https://www.trusted-
computinggroup.org/specs/TPM (last visited July 30, 2007). 
 161. See J. Alex Halderman, Evaluating New Copy-Prevention Techniques for Audio 
CDs, in ACM ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2002 ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT 101 (2002), available at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jhalderm/papers/-
drm2002.pdf. 
 162. The vast majority of commercially available DVDs utilize CSS, a method of 
encryption meant to ensure that only authorized devices and software can be used to ac-
cess content. The DVD CCA’s tight control over licensing of the keys necessary to ac-
cess DVDs has successfully prevented the distribution of devices that enable users to 
copy DVDs. But see DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc., supra note 153. 
 163. See Halderman, supra note 161. 
 164. For a study of the effectiveness of passive protection measures, see id.  
 165. Halderman & Felten, supra note 11, at 4. 
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Each song on a CD is stored as an individual track. Each track com-
prises a number of frames, each of which holds 1/75 second of audio.166 In 
addition, parallel data streams, called subchannels, are multiplexed with 
each track’s main data.167 These subchannels mark the divisions between 
tracks, the track number, and the current track running time.168 Aside from 
the track data, each CD contains a table of contents (TOC) which indicates 
the number of tracks and the starting position of each track.169 
By introducing errors into CD data and the TOC, passive protection 
measures attempt to exploit subtle differences in the hardware and soft-
ware of standard audio equipment and PCs.170 For example, because the 
CD specification requires a two second gap before the beginning of the 
first track,171 many PC CD drives specify time 00:02.00 as frame 0. By 
altering a TOC to indicate that the first track starts at time 00:01.74, pas-
sive protection measures can cause failure when a PC attempts to read the 
disc.172 But since standard CD players use a different frame address 
scheme, the altered TOC typically does not interfere with playback.173 
Other passive measures rely on changes to the track data itself. Most CD 
players, for example, interpolate over errors caused by corrupt audio sam-
ples.174 But since most PC CD-ROM drives cannot correct for such errors, 
by intentionally including corrupt samples, passive measures can interfere 
with the ability of PC drives to properly read protected discs without af-
fecting playback on standard audio equipment.175 
For a variety of reasons, passive protection measures proved to be at 
best an incomplete solution. First, some common audio components were 
unable to play back CDs with passive protection. Car stereos and DVD 
players with CD playback functionality often encountered difficulties with 
passively protected discs.176 Second, not all PC drives were susceptible to 
                                                                                                                         
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Halderman, supra note 161. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. See also INTERNATIONAL STANDARD NO. 60908, Audio Recording—
Compact Disc Digital Audio System (Int’l Electrotechnical Comm’n 1999). 
 172. Halderman, supra note 161. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Will Knight, Philips Says Copy-Protected CDs Have No Future, NEW SCIEN-
TIST, Jan. 11, 2002, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn1783; Sony’s ‘Copy-
Proof’ CD Fails to Silence Hackers, USA TODAY, May 20, 2002, http://www.usatoday.-
com/money/tech/2002-05-20-copyproof-cd.htm. 
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the rather crude methods relied upon by passive protection.177 And as 
these methods became more prevalent, new drives were designed to elimi-
nate the shortcomings of earlier hardware.178 Even for computer users 
whose drives had difficulty reading passively protected discs, the careful 
application of tape or a felt tip pen could defeat passive DRM.179 As a re-
sult, passive protection was largely abandoned in favor of active protec-
tion measures, which leave audio playback devices wholly undisturbed 
while providing greater and more flexible control over PCs.180 However, 
unlike passive protection measures, active protection measures introduced 
an additional difficulty for content owners and developers of protection 
measures: since active measures operate by means of software running on 
users’ machines, these measures needed to guarantee the installation of 
software most users would reject if given the choice. Luckily for copy pro-
tection proponents, the Windows computing environment made such in-
stallation without consent surprisingly easy. 
B. Technology as Enablement 
Technology not only motivated Sony BMG’s choice to deploy inva-
sive software-based DRM, but also provided the means to execute this 
strategy. Once installed, the rootkit itself helped to ensure that average 
consumers remained unaware of the software Sony BMG had installed on 
their machines. What enabled the stealth installation of the DRM software 
in the first place, however, was a standard feature of the dominant PC op-
erating system: Sony BMG relied on the AutoRun feature of the Windows 
operating system to run and install code on users’ machines without notice 
or consent. 
AutoRun allows software code contained on removable media, like 
CDs, to run automatically when inserted into a computer. When a CD is 
inserted into a computer, Windows scans the disc for a file named “Auto-
Run.inf.”181 If that file is present, Windows faithfully executes its instruc-
tions.182 The file could instruct the computer to launch a program, open a 
particular website, or take some other more harmful action. Despite the 
                                                                                                                         
 177. See Halderman, supra note 161. 
 178. Halderman & Felten, supra note 11, at 8. 
 179. See Halderman, supra note 161. 
 180. Some later discs used a combination of active and passive protection measures. 
Edward W. Felten & J. Alex Halderman, Digital Rights Management, Spyware, and Se-
curity, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 18, available at http://www.-
computer.org/portal/cms_docs_security/security/2006/v4n1/18-23.pdf. 
 181. Halderman & Felten, supra note 11, at 5. 
 182. Id. 
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potentially destructive power ceded by AutoRun, Microsoft included no 
meaningful safeguards for computer users.  
Using AutoRun, Sony BMG was able to install DRM software on 
computers without the knowledge or consent of users. Upon insertion of 
an XCP disc, AutoRun launched an installer program that presented users 
with the terms of the XCP EULA. If the user “accepted” the EULA terms, 
XCP installed software to play the CD and copy DRM-protected Windows 
Media files. These files, unlike MP3 files, cannot be copied to Apple’s 
iPod or other portable media players. If a user instead rejected the EULA, 
the CD was ejected from the machine. Furthermore, if a user launched an 
audio program prior to accepting the EULA and installing XCP, the auto-
launched installer gave the user thirty seconds to exit that program before 
the disc was ejected.183 For many, if not most, users, this procedure meant 
that the only way to listen to a protected disc on a computer was to install 
XCP. 
MediaMax employed even more aggressive tactics with the help of 
AutoRun. When inserted, MediaMax discs used AutoRun to install, with-
out notice or consent, a device driver that altered the user’s CD-ROM 
drive to prevent playback of MediaMax discs. Next, the installer presented 
the EULA. If accepted, the MediaMax software was installed. But if the 
user instead refused the terms of the EULA, the disc was ejected. Even if 
the user refused to accept the EULA, and the CD was ejected, 
SunnComm’s MediaMax technology often remained installed on the 
user’s computer—saddling users with all of the security and privacy vul-
nerabilities but providing no access to the music they purchased.184  
In the face of predictable user reluctance to actively impede their own 
lawful uses of legally purchased CDs, Sony BMG and its DRM vendors 
leveraged the dominant operating system’s lack of end user control over 
software installation decisions to clandestinely alter the personal comput-
ing environment of millions of users. In doing so, Sony BMG relied in 
part on methods used by spyware distributors to spread malicious code 
and seize remote control of users’ computers. Arguably, the decision to 
use these stealth techniques was motivated by the same desires—limiting 
user knowledge, engagement, and choice—that motivate their use in the 
spyware and malware contexts.  
Sony BMG’s use of these techniques occurred against a backdrop of 
efforts by companies, including Microsoft, to bolster user control over 
                                                                                                                         
 183. Id. at 6. 
 184. Id. at 7. 
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software installation through industry-wide efforts to create more mean-
ingful and effective consent mechanisms185 and product design to prevent 
the installation of spyware.186 These efforts recognized that the categoriza-
tion of products as malware or spyware depends as much on the consent 
experience and on satisfying user expectations as it does on a product’s 
functionality. Since the rootkit incident, Microsoft has taken at least one 
step that increases end user control over software installation. In Windows 
Vista, its most recent operating system, Microsoft has altered the AutoRun 
mechanism. On first encounter with an AutoRun disc, the user has the op-
portunity to permit or deny the automatic execution of code and can set 
defaults for future AutoRun discs.187 The lessons learned from Sony 
BMG’s decision to use AutoRun, and its misuse in other “drive-by” 
download exploits no doubt influenced this redesign. It is more consistent 
with the principles of usable security discussed below, and will likely as-
sist users in avoiding the installation of some insecure software. 
V. EXISTING LAW AND SKEWED INCENTIVES 
Sony BMG has paid dearly for its deployment of XCP and MediaMax 
through the investigations, litigation, and settlements that came in the 
wake of the rootkit incident.188 The example made of Sony BMG will 
                                                                                                                         
 185. The difficult of delineating “spyware” solely on the basis of software behavior 
has led legislators and industry to focus increasingly on the quality of the notice and con-
sent procedures around a software program’s installation in addition to its behavior. The 
Anti-Spyware Coalition’s Best Practices Guide is an example of this revival of interest in 
constraining reasonable notice and consent mechanisms and procedures. See ANTI-
SPYWARE COALITION, BEST PRACTICES: GUIDELINES TO CONSIDER IN THE EVALUATION 
OF POTENTIALLY UNWANTED TECHNOLOGIES (2007), available at http://www.-
antispywarecoalition.org/documents/documents/best_practices_final_working_report.pdf. 
 186. Id.; ANTI-SPYWARE COALITION, BEST PRACTICES: FACTORS FOR USE IN THE 
EVALUATION OF POTENTIALLY UNWANTED TECHNOLOGIES (2007), available at http://-
www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/documents/best_practices_public_comment_d
raft.pdf. 
 187. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, WINDOWS VISTA SECURITY GUIDE ch. 3 (2006), 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/windowsvista/security/protect_sensitive_data.mspx; 
CD AutoRun Basics: Windows Vista AutoPlay and AutoRun, http://www.phdcc.com/-
shellrun/AutoRun.htm#vista (last modified Dec. 19, 2006). 
 188. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement, supra note 69; Robert McMillan, Second Sony 
Rootkit Settlement Ups Payout to $5.75M, COMPUTER WORLD, Dec. 21, 2006, http://-
www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9006
620; Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, FTC File 
No. 062 3019 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/-
070130agreement0623019.pdf. 
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likely shape future DRM deployments by injecting security considerations 
into their development and by influencing notice and consent practices.189 
These developments, as we discuss in Part VI, provide a solid foundation 
for broader interdisciplinary efforts to improve privacy and security in the 
online environment. But rather than analyze the sufficiency of the price 
paid by Sony BMG for its misdeeds, we seek to understand why existing 
law failed to prevent the deployment of DRM with known security and 
privacy risks. In hindsight, it is apparent that Sony BMG’s decision to de-
ploy its DRM was woefully misguided, and that the statements about its 
data collection were inaccurate and incomplete. Assuming Sony BMG had 
competent legal counsel, the question is why the law failed to clearly alert 
Sony BMG of the illegality of this strategy. Equally important is an under-
standing of the failure of the law to empower users with the information 
and control to avoid these security and privacy risks. 
A complicated picture emerges. We contend in Section V.A that Sony 
BMG’s likely reliance on the hidden nature of the DRM’s functionality 
was buttressed in part by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anti-
circumvention rules, which discourage experts from studying the security 
risks posed by technological protection measures. By exposing security 
researchers to liability for their research, the DMCA discourages the front-
line of security defense in the online environment. The anti-trafficking 
rules similarly interfere with the distribution of information or tools that 
could assist users in disabling technological protection measures, like the 
Sony BMG DRM, in order to avoid risks to their privacy and security. 
Second, existing contract law has failed to set meaningful limits on the 
substance and formalities of click-wrap contracting. The unwillingness of 
courts to set substantive limits on EULAs and to critically consider the 
consent experience created an environment in which unreasonable mate-
rial terms can be inserted into EULAs with impunity. And without a 
meaningful consent experience, users cannot even hope to have notice of 
the terms foisted upon them by these mass-market form contracts. Third 
and finally, the focus of U.S. privacy initiatives on a narrowly defined 
class of “personally identifiable information” created uncertainty about 
privacy rules for businesses using unique identifiers, such as IP addresses, 
to identify or monitor users. By discouraging security research on techno-
logical protection measures, failing to take a hard look at the terms and 
                                                                                                                         
 189. Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Regulating Digital Rights Management 
Technologies: Should Copyright Owners Have to Give Notice About DRM Restrictions?,  
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 17, available at 
http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/notice%20of%20DRM-701.pdf). 
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formalities of “click-wrap” agreements, and neglecting to provide guid-
ance on privacy issues beyond those arising with “personal identifying in-
formation,” courts and regulators failed to strike the appropriate balance 
between commercial convenience, on the one hand, and consumer protec-
tion and empowerment, on the other.  
A. The DMCA’s Veil of Secrecy  
At present, federal law does not explicitly endorse invasive attacks by 
copyright holders against the computers of suspected infringers. Proposals 
like H.R. 5211, introduced by Representative Howard Berman in 2002, 
would have enabled such self-help hacking in the name of enforcing intel-
lectual property rights.190 Congress rightly rejected this approach.191 But 
even in the absence of any official congressional imprimatur on invasive 
self-help, Congress has created a set of disincentives through the DMCA 
that, if not appropriately checked, could yield the same result—namely, 
unrestrained and overzealous copyright enforcement mechanisms that en-
danger the security of personal computers and the network generally.  
This Section considers the implications of the DMCA on the security 
researchers who serve as the primary source of information regarding abu-
sive protection measures for the public, law enforcement, and regulators. 
By imposing potential liability for discovery, disclosure, and deactivation 
of harmful protection measures, the DMCA was perhaps the primary 
component of the legal framework that failed to prevent the rootkit inci-
dent.  
In the weeks and months prior to the public disclosure of the XCP 
rootkit, two prominent computer security and DRM researchers, Professor 
Ed Felten and J. Alex Halderman, were forced to divide their energy be-
tween researching and publicizing the dangerous implications of Sony 
BMG’s protection measures, on the one hand, and engaging in protracted 
discussions of potential DMCA liability with both their outside legal team 
and the general counsel of their academic institution, on the other.192 The 
                                                                                                                         
 190. H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c107:H.R.5211:. 
 191. Legislative History of H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR05211:@@@X. 
 192. Halderman and Felten were clients of the Samuelson Law, Technology & Public 
Policy Clinic directed by Mulligan. Perzanowski was the student most intimately and 
continuously involved in advising Halderman and Felten. Clinic Fellow Jack Lerner and 
clinic student interns Sara Adibisedeh, Azra Medjedovic, and Brian W. Carver all par-
ticipated in the representation at various times. Joseph Lorenzo Hall, a Ph.D student at 
Berkeley’s Information School and a long-standing participant in the Samuelson Clinic’s 
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caution displayed by Halderman and Felten is hardly surprising given their 
personal histories with the DMCA. Both have been threatened with legal 
action in the past and are therefore acutely aware of the exacting toll of 
litigation threats, regardless of the merits of the claims.193 But the neces-
sary delay caused by legal uncertainty left millions at risk for weeks 
longer than necessary.  
In broad terms, the DMCA undergirds the technological protection 
measures adopted by copyright holders with the force of law. The statute 
prohibits circumvention of any measure that effectively protects access to 
a copyrighted work.194 In addition, the DMCA imposes liability on those 
who traffic in tools, devices, components, or services primarily designed, 
marketed, or commercially viable only for the purpose of circumventing 
protection measures that control access to or copying of copyrighted 
works.195 Both the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of 
the DMCA contribute to the ominous shadow that hangs over researchers 
examining the security of any product protected by a technological protec-
tion measure,196 a pall most strongly felt by those examining the protection 
                                                                                                                         
research, provided technical advice and support to law students working on this project. 
As Felten and Halderman wrote, “Sadly, research of this type does seem to require sup-
port from a team of lawyers.” As much as the lawyers enjoyed the privilege of working 
with and representing interesting people doing important work, they share their former 
clients’ dismay at this particular state of affairs.  
 193. In 2000, Felten and a team of researchers, after accepting a challenge from the 
Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), succeeded in breaking SDMI’s digital audio wa-
termark. After facing legal threats under the DMCA, Professor Felten filed for declara-
tory judgment seeking a determination that his research did not violate the DMCA. Only 
after the RIAA disavowed any intent to file suit was that action dismissed. See Tinkerers’ 
Champion, THE ECONOMIST, June 22, 2002; First Amended Complaint, Felten v. Re-
cording Indus. of Am., Inc., No. CV-01-2660 (D.N.J. June 26, 2001), available at http://-
www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010626_eff_felten_amended_complaint.html. 
In 2003, Halderman published an academic paper discussing his research on 
SunnComm’s MediaMax protection measure. See supra note 4. Shortly thereafter, 
SunnComm threatened Halderman with legal action for his academic publication. Kevin 
Maney, Debate Heats Up as Student Spots Hole in CD Protection, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 
2003, at 1A. After scathing criticism of its attempt to silence legitimate research, 
SunnComm publicly retracted this threat. See Lisa Napoli, Compressed Data; Shift Key 
Opens Door to CD and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at C3. 
 194. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 195. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2000). 
 196. See generally Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 
(6th Cir. 2004). 
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measures applied to creative works—music, movies, novels—that the 
DMCA was intended to protect.197 
In their efforts to determine the security threats posed by DRM sys-
tems like XCP and MediaMax, researchers are likely to disable or remove 
some portion or the entirety of the protection measure, and thus potentially 
run afoul of the DMCA’s prohibition against circumvention.198 Assuming 
researchers—and their institutions—are willing to accept these risks, they 
could face further threats of litigation for publishing the results of their 
research. To the extent that publication of sufficiently detailed findings 
enabled others to circumvent the protection measure, it could lead to 
claims of trafficking. Although such claims are unlikely to succeed,199 the 
                                                                                                                         
 197. As discussed supra, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has been 
used to threaten academic research. But the chilling effect of the DMCA has extended far 
beyond security research. It has impeded tinkering with online games and gadgets and 
interfered with online speech. See supra notes 151 and 152; ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2006), 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf.  
Nor is the DMCA the only legal barrier to improving computer security. Bucking the 
call for growing scrutiny and improvement of electronic voting technology, dominant 
election system vendors have used the threat of legal action based on intellectual property 
violations to interfere with competition, impede the review of electronic systems by regu-
lators, and chill public discourse about the lax security of their machines. For an over-
view of the issues faced by election officials see AARON BURSTEIN ET AL., SAMUELSON 
LAW, TECHNOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY CLINIC, LEGAL ISSUES FACING ELECTION OFFI-
CIALS IN AN ELECTRONIC-VOTING WORLD (2007), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/-
samuelson/projects_papers/Legal_Issues_Elections_Officials_FINAL.pdf. 
 198. The great irony, of course, is that although during the exploration of the security 
risks posed by the DRM researchers are likely to disable or remove some portion or the 
entirety of the protection measure, and thus potentially run afoul of the DMCA, engaging 
in such research does not constitute copyright infringement. Indeed, security researchers 
are concerned with the manner in which protection measures function and the security 
threats they may pose; they have no interest in the copyrighted content those measures 
are meant to protect. 
 199. Statements made by the Department of Justice in Felten v. RIAA are instructive. 
In that case, the DOJ argued against an interpretation of “tools” that would include “nor-
mal scientific research” and publishing. Defendant John Ashcroft’s Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss, at 17, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. 01-
CV-2669 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2001) (“[t]he Plaintiffs are scientists attempting to study ac-
cess control technologies. The DMCA simply does not apply to such conduct.”). The 
DOJ did reserve the possibility that “making available a publication that describes in de-
tail how to go about circumventing a particular technology, if written or marketed for the 
express purpose of actually circumventing that technology,” could be prosecuted under 
the statute. Id. at 17 n.5. Some cases involving defendants who publicly distribute and 
advertise what effectively amount to step-by-step instruction guides on how to commit 
crimes have resulted in successful prosecutions in other areas. See, e.g., Rice v. The Pala-
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threat of litigation and the associated expense is sufficient to alter research 
agendas. Finally, assuming researchers discovered a security flaw that 
posed a significant threat to the public, as in the case of Sony BMG’s 
DRM, and sought to provide a tool to enable the average computer user to 
quickly and safely avoid the harms posed by the protection measure, they 
almost certainly would raise the ire of the content industry to a fever pitch 
and draw a trafficking claim under the DMCA. Together the anti-
circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions chill computer security re-
search and create enormous disincentives to provide the information and 
tools necessary to enable computer users to avoid security and privacy 
risks once dangerous technologies have been deployed.  
A detailed analysis of potential liability under the DMCA and the 
ways in which it complicates research, publication, and the dissemination 
of tools related to DRM is beyond the scope of this Article.200 Nonethe-
less, there are good reasons to doubt that liability should attach in these 
circumstances. First, the more enlightened courts to analyze the DMCA 
recognize that liability requires some nexus between the act of circumven-
tion and an act of copyright infringement.201 Where circumvention and 
                                                                                                                         
din Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 
842 (9th Cir. 1982). However, sharing general information about how to commit criminal 
acts that is unlikely to incite others to imminently take lawless action typically fails to 
justify restricting its expression. McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Given that security research is not marketed for the purpose of circumvention, it is 
unlikely to be found to incite others to imminently commit unlawful acts. 
 200. As counsel to Halderman and Felten, the authors have conducted an exhaustive 
analysis of this issue. 
 201. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), succinctly sets forth the applicable law on this point: 
A plaintiff alleging a violation of § 1201(a)(2) must prove: (1) owner-
ship of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively controlled by a 
technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that third par-
ties can now access (4) without authorization, in a manner that (5) in-
fringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act, 
because of a product that (6) the defendant either: (i) designed or pro-
duced primarily for circumvention; (ii) made available despite only 
limited commercial significance other than circumvention; or (iii) mar-
keted for use in circumvention of the controlling technological meas-
ure.  
Chamberlain Group, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1203; accord Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cus-
tom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (in 
order to prevail in a DMCA claim, the plaintiff must also be able to succeed on 
the merits in an underlying copyright infringement suit).  
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publication take place in the context of academic research, courts should 
be reluctant to find the requisite nexus.  
Second, at least with respect to Sony BMG’s DRM, it is far from clear 
that the technological protection measures at issue would have been found 
to “effectively control access” to the CDs.202 Absent such a finding, re-
search and subsequent publication, or even distribution of a tool, would 
not be actionable under the DMCA’s anti-circumvention and anti-
trafficking provisions.203 In Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Compo-
nents, Inc., the Sixth Circuit explained that section 1201(a)(2) does not 
extend to a technological measure that restricts one form of access but 
leaves another route wide open.204 XCP and MediaMax both left audio 
content unprotected and accessible by other obvious means.205 Purchasers 
could access the tracks without restriction on their CD players, any Apple 
computer, or any Windows machine on which AutoRun was disabled.206 
Under these circumstances, the availability of DMCA protection is an 
open question. 
                                                                                                                         
 202. Per the statute, “controls access to a work” means that if the measure, in the or-
dinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a 
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work. 17 
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2000). 
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a), (b) (2000). 
 204. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 547 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
 205. Some files, such as bonus video content or compressed audio files, are not ac-
cessible through these other means. But since removal of the protection measure does not 
grant access to these files, the fact that they remain protected cannot support a claim of 
circumvention. 
 206. DRM vendors and copyright holders would likely have argued that their controls 
are effective “in the ordinary course of its operation,” i.e., in the environment in which 
they were intended to be used. This argument assumes that the DRM vendors have some 
authority to control the underlying configuration of a user’s machine. Given that access to 
the audio files is not protected on some standard-configured Windows computers and on 
Macs, this argument would implicitly suggest that users with “normally configured” ma-
chines are engaged in illegal circumvention. To succeed on this argument, Sony BMG 
would have to convince the court to adopt the position that the licensor has the right to 
control the general computing environment in which the consumer makes personal use of 
the CD audio files. It is difficult to imagine this argument proving persuasive, given its 
rather radical and broad implications, and given that its adoption would run counter to the 
“no technology mandates” provision in the DMCA, which states: “Nothing in this section 
shall require that the design of, or design and selection of parts and components for, a 
consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing product provide for a response 
to any particular technological measure . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3) (2000). 
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An additional wrinkle in the analysis of potential liability facing re-
searchers arises from the security testing exemption in section 1201(j), 
which applies to both the anti-circumvention provision and the anti-
trafficking provision of 1201(a). It is the only statutory exemption that 
could potentially shield security researchers who disable protection meas-
ures like XCP and MediaMax and traffic in tools that enable others to 
avoid security risks. However, the scope of this exemption is, at best, un-
certain,207 and its applicability to the rootkit incident and similar potential 
circumstances is unsettled. First, section 1201(j)(1) limits the definition of 
“security testing” to “accessing a computer, computer system, or computer 
network, solely for the purpose of good faith testing.”208 This definition 
may not apply to circumvention of technological measures that protect 
third party content stored on removable media, such as sound recordings 
on CDs, that are distinct from the computer, system, or network. The scant 
legislative history offers some support for this reading. Section 1201(j) 
was adopted to accommodate concerns raised by developers of firewalls 
who wanted to ensure that they, their customers, and their competitors 
could test the effectiveness of their products.209 In addition, since the sole 
purpose of security research is not to “promote the security of the owner 
or operator,” but rather to protect the security of the public broadly—a 
purpose that may require widespread publication of information regarding 
removing the protection measure at issue—this sort of research could run 
                                                                                                                         
 207. Section 1201(j) has been given short shrift in judicial opinions addressing the 
DMCA. Aside from a passing and dismissive reference in Universal City Studios v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), the exemption has been ignored 
by both courts and litigants. What attention the Reimerdes court did pay to 1201(j) was 
marred by a misreading of the statute. The court held that because “defendants sought, 
and plaintiffs granted, no authorization for defendants’ activities” § 1201(j) did not apply. 
Id. The leading academic interpreting the statute also finds that the statute requires au-
thorization. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of 
Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1648 n.339 (2002) (“The computer security 
exception requires that the researcher actually get, and not just ask for, permission to de-
feat the technical protection measure.”). However, the statute requires authorization not 
from the copyright holder, but from the owner or operator of the computer. This 
Reimerdes court’s reading is therefore almost certainly a misapplication of the statute.  
 208. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) (2000). 
 209. The Conference Report on the DMCA offers further support for this narrow 
reading of the definition of security testing under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j). That report ex-
plained, “It is not unlawful to test the effectiveness of a security measure before it is im-
plemented to protect the work covered under title 17. Nor is it unlawful for a person who 
has implemented a security measure to test its effectiveness.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 
67 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
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afoul of the statute.210 As discussed infra, the scope of the security re-
search exemption was sufficiently unclear to justify the Copyright Office’s 
decision to grant a temporary exemption to enable research on security-
flawed CD-based protection measures. 
Even assuming a competent legal team and success on the merits, de-
fending against a DMCA suit consumes enormous resources. The threat of 
litigation understandably chills security research related to DRM. Sup-
pressing research of this sort disables an important check on the safety and 
soundness of products in the consumer marketplace. Just as Consumers 
Union and other independent analysis and benchmarking entities act as 
independent checks on quality and safety for consumer products, computer 
security researchers play an important role in evaluating the security, pri-
vacy, usability, and other consumer-relevant effects of software. Prevent-
ing computer security researchers from evaluating products that contain 
technological protection measures removes an important player in the 
market ecosystem with respect to consumer protection.  
Without the efforts of security researchers who discovered and publi-
cized the risks created by Sony BMG’s DRM,211 consumers and policy-
makers would be nearly universally uninformed about security threats and 
other unknown consequences of DRM—a fact likely well understood by 
copyright holders who choose to deploy stealth protection measures with 
undisclosed functionalities. The vast majority of computer users lack the 
expertise to discover these threats independently. There is no government 
agency that is explicitly authorized to examine DRM or other technologi-
cal protection measures to assess their policy implications or ramifica-
tions—security or other—on behalf of consumers. As a result, consumers 
must either rely on the research conducted by security experts212 or blindly 
trust software developers and content owners to exercise restraint in de-
signing protection measures that respect consumers’ privacy and security 
interests.213  
                                                                                                                         
 210. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(3) (2000). 
 211. See supra Section I.A. 
 212. The DMCA harms consumers not only by denying them the expertise of re-
searchers, but also by imposing liability for self-help. Once some information regarding 
the existence and functionality of a protection measure becomes available, many enter-
prising users could remove it on their own. However, the DMCA creates threats against 
users as well as researchers. 
 213. Posting of Ed Felten & J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to Tinker, http://www.-
freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=927 (Nov. 15, 2005, 07:07 EST). The rootkit incident and the 
historic use of monitoring in online content distribution systems suggests that such reli-
ance would be misplaced. Deirdre K. Mulligan et al., How DRM-based Content Delivery 
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B. The Insufficiency of Consent 
Aside from the force of law conferred by the DMCA, Sony BMG’s 
DRM scheme benefited from some degree of legal protection offered by 
its software licenses. These licenses arguably enabled Sony BMG to main-
tain that users of XCP and MediaMax assented to the installation and 
functionality of Sony BMG’s DRM. But the vast majority of Sony BMG 
customers lacked any meaningful understanding of the functionality of 
these protection measures, in part as a result of Sony BMG’s misleading 
license terms and in part because of deficiencies in the consent experience 
associated with click-wrap licenses generally. Despite these barriers to 
meaningful consent, under contemporary contract doctrine, most of the 
terms of the XCP and MediaMax EULAs would be enforced against users, 
further emboldening Sony BMG. 
XCP and MediaMax, like almost all consumer software, were distrib-
uted under the terms of EULAs. Typically EULAs disclose, among other 
things, the data collection, advertising, and other program functionalities 
of software, and require a “click” or other affirmative act to acknowledge 
the user’s consent to the terms. In the case of the Sony BMG DRM pro-
tected CDs, the EULAs contained false statements claiming that no per-
sonal information would be collected about the user or their computer.214 
Indeed, the EULA governing DRM-protected Sony BMG CDs explicitly 
disavowed any collection or dissemination of data related to customers or 
their computers. The XCP EULA stated in part “the SOFTWARE will not 
be used at any time to collect any personal information from you, whether 
                                                                                                                         
Systems Disrupt Expectations of “Personal Use”, in ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHIN-
ERY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 77 
(2003). 
 214. The EULA stated, “[T]he SOFTWARE will not be used at any time to collect 
any personal information from you, whether stored on YOUR COMPUTER or other-
wise.” Sony BMG MediaMax EULA (emphasis added) (on file with authors). The use of 
the term “personal information”, rather than “personally identifiable information”, cre-
ated exposure here for Sony BMG, as discussed infra in Section V.C. Information at the 
SunnComm Sony BMG customer care website further misleads consumers, stating, “No 
information is ever collected about you or your computer without you [sic] consenting” 
and also states: “Is any personal information collected from my computer during the digi-
tal key delivery process? No, during the digital key delivery process, no information is 
ever collected about you or your computer.” Posting of J. Alex Halderman to Freedom to 
Tinker, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=925 (Nov. 12, 2005, 12:30 EST) (empha-
sis added). The lack of any modifiers with respect to “information” is startling. This state-
ment would prohibit any connection to a remote server. The lack of consistency in termi-
nology across the documents and the failure to use existing legally accepted definitions to 
describe the data they were claiming not to collect proved exceedingly problematic.  
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stored on YOUR COMPUTER or otherwise.”215 The MediaMax license 
agreement contained similar language.216 In fact, both the XCP and Me-
diaMax DRM collected and transmitted to Sony BMG the user’s IP ad-
dress, the time the CD was played, and a code corresponding to the par-
ticular CD title being played. Additionally, the EULA contained a host of 
overreaching terms.217 The most significant was a provision permitting 
Sony BMG to install and use backdoors in the DRM and media player to 
enforce its rights at any time and without notice to the user.218 Like the 
security threats introduced by XCP and MediaMax, the overreaching, 
false, and confusing statements found in the EULA were of the sort typi-
cally associated with spyware. 
Since components of Sony BMG’s DRM installed—sometimes per-
manently—before customers were confronted with the EULA terms, the 
CD packaging provided the only available means of pre-installation no-
tice. But the information conveyed by the packaging left much to be de-
sired. It too failed to provide adequate information about the installation 
and functionality of the software. XCP-protected discs contained the IFPI 
“Content Protected” logo on the front of the CD jewel case spine219 and a 
small “content protection grid,” illustrated below in Figure 1, on their back 
covers.220 The majority of MediaMax discs included similar grids.221 Oth-
ers featured ambiguous disclosures in miniscule type, buried within sys-
tem requirements.222 Some neglected to inform customers that the CD 
                                                                                                                         
 215. Sony BMG XCP EULA (Jan. 7, 2005) (on file with authors).  
 216. “At no time will any information provided by you in connection with the instal-
lation of the software system be collected about you or your computer.” Sony BMG Me-
diaMax EULA, supra note 214. 
 217. See supra note 27. 
 218. “As soon as you have agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the 
EULA, this CD will automatically install a small proprietary software program (the 
‘SOFTWARE’) onto YOUR COMPUTER. The SOFTWARE is intended to protect the 
audio files embodied on the CD, and it may also facilitate your use of the DIGITAL 
CONTENT. Once installed, the SOFTWARE will reside on YOUR COMPUTER until 
removed or deleted.” Sony BMG XCP EULA, supra note 215. 
 219. Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 57. 
 220. CD’s Containing XCP Content Protection Technology, Sony BMG, http://cp.-
sonybmg.com/xcp/english/titles.html. 
 221. Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 57. 
 222. For a number of examples, see Gallery of Variations on SunnComm MediaMax 
CD Labeling, http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/mediamaxpics.php (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2007). 
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would automatically install software on their systems,223 while others 
failed to disclose any of the restrictions on copying or accessing content 
imposed by the MediaMax software.224 These half-hearted disclosures 
failed to provide Sony BMG customers with fair warning of the security 
and privacy threats or the scope of the limitations on use imposed by its 
DRM. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Users who took the time to sift through the nearly 3000-word XCP 
EULA225 gleaned some additional detail beyond the cursory notice pro-
vided on the CD packaging. But the EULA failed to fully disclose the se-
curity and privacy risks imposed by Sony BMG’s protection measures. 
Once customers purchased CDs and attempted to listen to them using their 
computers, the EULA—assuming they read it226—informed them:  
Before you can play the audio files on YOUR COMPUTER or 
create and/or transfer the DIGITAL CONTENT to YOUR 
COMPUTER, you will need to review and agree to be bound by 
                                                                                                                         
 223. See, e.g., http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/img/cubanlink_close.jpg 
(“THIS CD IS ENHANCED WITH MEDIAMAX SOFTWARE AND PROTECTED 
AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION.”) 
 224. Some stated:  
This CD is enhanced with Media Max software . . . . Software will 
automatically install . . . . Usage of this CD on your computer requires 
acceptance of the End User License Agreement and installation of spe-
cific software contained on this CD . . . . Certain computers may not be 
able to access the enhanced portion of this disc. None of the manufac-
turer, developer, or distributor [sic] makes any representation or war-
ranty, or assumes any responsibility, with respect to the enhanced por-
tion of this disc. 
See http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/img/contraband_close2.jpg 
 225. Sony BMG XCP EULA, supra note 215.  
 226. Users frequently ignore or fail to read EULAs. Nathaniel Good et al., User 
Choices and Regret: Understanding Users’ Decision Process About Consensually Ac-
quired Spyware, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y. 283 (2006). 
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an end user license agreement . . . . As soon as you have agreed 
to be bound by the terms and conditions of the EULA, this CD 
will automatically install a small proprietary software program 
(the “SOFTWARE”) onto YOUR COMPUTER. The SOFT-
WARE is intended to protect the audio files embodied on the 
CD, and it may also facilitate your use of the DIGITAL CON-
TENT.227 
So while the EULA informed users that a small program would be in-
stalled on their machines, it provided no information about the specific 
restrictions that program placed on use of the CD or the manner in which 
it operated. Even customers who proactively sought information about the 
XCP software had no way, short of installing the software and running 
sophisticated diagnostic tests,228 to discover the security vulnerabilities it 
introduced or that its explicit assurances regarding the collection of per-
sonal information were false. The same held true for the MediaMax 
EULA.229 All but the most sophisticated users were left to blindly trust 
Sony BMG’s incomplete and misleading disclosures. By doing so, they 
unwittingly opened their PCs to crippling attacks and their personal infor-
mation to collection and transmission, both in exchange for restricted ac-
cess to the music they believed they had purchased.  
Because the EULA did disclose, albeit poorly, provisions that pro-
vided for Sony BMG’s backdoor access and remote control over the user’s 
computer—the provisions posing the greatest threats to security—courts 
would likely enforce those terms.230 While EULA language is typically far 
from clear, even for those familiar with legal documents, courts are reluc-
tant to excuse violations on the basis of unclear language. Nor do courts 
excuse consumers from license obligations on the basis of their failure to 
read EULA terms. As a matter of contract formation, courts typically find 
                                                                                                                         
 227. Sony BMG XCP EULA, supra note 215. 
 228. Exceedingly few users possess the software and know-how necessary to conduct 
the sort of investigation engaged in by Mark Russinovich or Felten and Halderman. See 
Mark’s Blog, supra note 6; Halderman & Felten, supra note 11. 
 229. “In order to properly utilize this CD on your computer, it is necessary to install a 
small software program on your computer hard drive.” Sony BMG MediaMax EULA, 
supra note 214. 
 230. See Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1345 (2005). The doctrine of unconscionability, while unlikely to succeed, would provide 
the strongest basis for voiding this particular term. The form contracting of the EULA, 
the unexpected behavior of the software, and the general surprise of consumers that any 
software at all was being downloaded on to their computer, along with the potential harm 
the consumer is exposed to would lend support to a finding of unconscionability.  
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that installing or using the software is sufficient to establish acceptance of 
EULA terms even when users are not required to click “I Agree.”231 
Whether consumers actually read the EULAs or whether they were de-
signed to encourage reading or comprehension is generally not of interest 
to courts. When a document is reasonably understood to create legal obli-
gations, courts impose a duty to read.232 This obligation to read extends 
not just to EULAs, but to documents hyperlinked from EULAs as well.233 
If users read and understood the terms of software EULAs, many would 
be surprised by the number of legal obligations they create. As with the 
bizarre terms in the Sony BMG license that prohibited use of the CDs on 
office computers and terminated the licensee’s rights in the CD if it was 
stolen or if the user filed for bankruptcy, the restrictions and obligations 
created in EULAs are often incongruous with consumer expectations 
about the contents of these documents.234 
Unless squarely at odds with public policy or deemed unconscionable, 
EULA terms are generally enforced. Unconscionability requires both pro-
cedural defects in the contract formation process and substantive terms 
                                                                                                                         
 231. See Tarra Zynda, Note, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.: Preserving 
Minimum Requirements of Contract on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 495, 504-
05 (2004). 
 232. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 233. Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  Hubbert was fol-
lowed twice in Nadler v. Merlin Int’l, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19651 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 
20, 2007) and Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 234. Nathan Good et al., Noticing Notice: A Large-Scale Experiment on the Timing of 
Software License Agreements, in 1 ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY SPECIAL INTER-
EST GROUP ON COMPUTER-HUMAN INTERACTION, CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 607 (Bo Begole & Stephen Payne eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/~jensg/research/paper/Grossklags07-CHI-
noticing_notice.pdf; Deirdre Mulligan et al., Stopping Spyware at the Gate: A User Study 
of Privacy, Notice and Spyware, in 93 ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDING 
SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2005 SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 43 
(2005). The overreaching and unexpected content of Sony BMG’s EULA does not set it 
apart as an outlier. For example, after just a few clicks, a user installing a well-known and 
popular file-sharing program agrees to provisions that prohibit reverse engineering, dis-
abling advertisements, and removing third party software; force them into mandatory 
arbitration; permit the sharing of the user’s contact information and browsing history; and 
bind all subsequent users of the software to the EULA.  
The iTunes EULA includes: “You also agree that you will not use these products for 
the development, design, manufacture, or production of missiles, or nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons.” Apple QuickTime 7.0.4 (free version for Windows) and iTunes 
EULA (on file with authors). 
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that unfairly oppress one party to the contract.235 In the context of the 
Sony BMG EULA, many courts would not object to the formation process 
itself, given Sony BMG’s use of current industry standard mechanisms 
like the scroll box and click through assent.236 Nonetheless, research and 
experience show this process does not engage users in any meaningful 
way in the contracting process.237 And, while the installation of software 
that can be remotely updated and can enforce Sony BMG’s rights with re-
spect to content sounds substantively problematic, it is consistent with the 
operation of other online content delivery systems for movies and mu-
sic.238 So embedding a term requiring users to consent to the installation of 
a backdoor allowing remote updates and ongoing access to the user’s 
computer in a dense and lengthy EULA is not quite the aberration it seems 
to be, although we contend that it should be. This is, in fact, the direction 
in which content protection schemes in the PC environment are moving.239 
Although the security and privacy flaws created by the DRM could pro-
vide a basis for a substantive challenge to the EULA, unconscionability 
requires both substantive and procedural defects.  
                                                                                                                         
 235. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
 236. But see Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] contract of 
adhesion, i.e., a standardized contract, drafted by the party of superior bargaining 
strength, that relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the con-
tract or reject it” is necessarily procedurally unconscionable). 
 237. Good et al., supra note 234.  
 238. See Mulligan et al., supra note 213 (discussing monitoring of user activities 
identified in EULAs and by monitoring program activities). 
 239. The general movement toward platforms and software that allow for remote 
attestation about software behavior is found in industry efforts around the creation of a 
trusted computing platform. This technology is designed to allow one party to verify the 
“state” and operations of another’s machine. In the context of asset management, where a 
business wants to assure that all the machines remotely connecting to its network are con-
figured in a manner that will protect business interests (personal information, intellectual 
property, etc.) remote attestation is a promising development. In the context of content 
owners seeking to monitor the state (what software is running) and activity of a home 
user’s computer in order to protect digital content, the issue of remote attestation is far 
more problematic and has come, appropriately, under fire. In fact, one legislative effort to 
deputize this sort of private sector monitoring of private use of content and to privilege 
self-help by content companies was already vetted and rejected. Hopefully other systems 
that support remote access to consumers’ computers will not introduce security holes, 
although developing systems that allow for remote access and control of networked PCs 
that cannot be exploited by a motivated attacker is likely a complicated task. Ross Ander-
son, ‘Trusted Computing’ Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/-
tcpa-faq.html (last updated Aug. 2003); SCHOEN, supra note 158. 
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Existing law did not dissuade Sony BMG from introducing DRM-
protected CDs that created security flaws. While it is almost certain that 
users had little to no idea that installing the XCP and MediaMax DRM 
would open security backdoors into their computers or allow remote moni-
toring of their activities and knowledge of their machine configuration, 
current EULA and contract law provides little hope for fixing the structure 
of either the consent process or the substantive terms of such contracts. As 
discussed supra, courts have shown little interest in examining all but the 
most egregious of contract terms and formation issues.  
The need to consider the totality of the consumer contracting experi-
ence, rather than specific terms in isolation, suggests that successfully re-
structuring these interactions will require detailed fact finding about con-
sumers’ understandings and expectations, and the harms and risks to con-
sumers and competition created by specific terms and consent procedures. 
Creating more nuanced and specific rules to govern consent with respect 
to software downloads is a task better undertaken by an administrative 
agency with deep expertise in consumer protection and the ability to pro-
vide guidance and forward-looking rules than by the courts. In the next 
Section, we consider the Federal Trade Commission’s response to the 
flawed notice and consent provisions of Sony BMG’s DRM and the pri-
vacy concerns to which they contributed. 
C. Defining Deceptive and Unfair Acts: The Problem with 
Software Downloads and Privacy 
At the time Sony BMG placed its DRM-protected CDs on the market, 
the FTC had already long demonstrated its authority to investigate and pe-
nalize parties making false statements about the collection, use, and dis-
closure of personal information.240 In particular, successful enforcement 
                                                                                                                         
 240. See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, FTC 
File No. 062 3019 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/-
070130agreement0623019.pdf. 
[T]he disclosure shall be unavoidable and shall be presented prior to the 
consumer installing any content protection software or, if the disclosure 
is related to Internet connectivity, prior to causing any transmission to 
respondent about consumers, their computers, or their use of a covered 
product through Internet servers. The disclosure shall be of a size and 
shade, and shall appear on the screen for a duration, sufficient for an 
ordinary consumer to read and comprehend it. The disclosure shall be 
in understandable language and syntax.  
Id. See FTC v. Seismic Entm’t, Inc., No. 04-377, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 (D.N.H. 
Oct. 21, 2004) (enjoining the unfair practice of exploiting a known vulnerability in the 
Internet Explorer web browser to download spyware to users’ computers without their 
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actions were brought against companies, like Sony BMG, that offered 
public statements falsely disavowing the collection of information from 
users.241 More recently, the FTC used its authority to bind companies to 
practices and procedures that provide a “reasonable” level of security for 
users’ personal information.242 Importantly, it successfully settled claims 
against companies for failing to implement practices to address commonly 
known and well-understood security vulnerabilities and for failing to iden-
tify and prevent security vulnerabilities that put customer information at 
risk.243  
In light of these existing FTC actions, Sony BMG’s inaccurate state-
ments about data collection practices and software security, including vul-
nerabilities that could compromise personally identifiable information, 
appear inexplicable. However, a more careful consideration of the FTC’s 
prior actions sheds some light on why Sony BMG may not have consid-
ered its practices objectionable as a matter of established FTC guidelines. 
The centerpiece of the FTC’s privacy enforcement actions has been the 
protection of individually identifiable personal information.244 But, under 
                                                                                                                         
knowledge); In re Advertising.com, FTC File No. 042 3196 (Sept. 12, 2005). See also 
Complaint, FTC v. Odysseus Mktg., Inc., No. 05-CV-330 (D.N.H. Sept. 21, 2005) (fail-
ure to clearly and conspicuously disclose bundled software with security and privacy 
risks is deceptive). 
 241. See Microsoft Corp., 67 Fed. Reg. 52,723 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Aug. 13, 2002) 
(proposed consent order) (alleging that Passport misrepresented its data collection activi-
ties and obtaining consent order prohibiting such misrepresentations). 
 242. See MTS Inc., 69 Fed. Reg. 23,205 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Apr. 28, 2004) (pro-
posed consent order) (failure to implement procedures that were reasonable and appropri-
ate to detect and prevent “broken account and session management” vulnerabilities was 
unfair or deceptive given Tower Records’s statements about attention to security and 
privacy); Eli Lilly & Co., 67 Fed. Reg. 4,963 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 1, 2002) (pro-
posed consent order) (lack of proper controls to avoid disclosure of e-mail addresses was 
unfair or deceptive given statements to the contrary). 
 243. See Decision and Order, In re MTS, Inc., FTC File No. 032 3209 (May 28, 
2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323209/040602do0323209.pdf; Deci-
sion and Order, In re Guess?, Inc., FTC File No. 022 3260 (Aug. 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/guessdo.pdf; Decision and Order, In re Petco Animal 
Supplies, Inc., FTC File No. 032 3221 (Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.-
gov/os/caselist/0323221/050308do0323221.pdf; Agreement Containing Consent Order, 
In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., FTC File No. 042 3160 (May 17, 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/050616agree0423160.pdf. 
 244. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000). 
[Personal information means] individually identifiable information 
about an individual collected online including (a) a first and last name; 
(b) a home or other physical address including street name and name of 
a city or town; (c) an email address or other online contact information, 
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a literal reading of the FTC’s application of that term, Sony BMG was not 
collecting “personal information.” According to the FTC, the Sony BMG 
media player “establish[ed] a connection with Internet servers through 
which the user’s or proxy server’s Internet Protocol (IP) address and a 
numerical key identifying the album being played will be transmitted from 
the user’s computer to the servers.”245 Such information was “used to dis-
play images and/or promotional messages on users’ computers that are 
retrieved from those servers.”246 Under its only official statement on the 
issue, the FTC has said that “unless [IP addresses] are associated with 
other individually identifiable personal information, they would not fall 
within the . . . definition of ‘personal information’” regulated by the Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act.247 Sony BMG’s stance—that it col-
lected no personal information that raised privacy concerns248—may seem 
counterintuitive, but viewed in light of the prevailing FTC definition of 
“personal information,” Sony BMG’s position becomes somewhat more 
coherent. While this in no way excuses the misleading statements found in 
                                                                                                                         
including but not limited to an instant messaging user identifier, or a 
screen name that reveals an individual’s email address; (d) a telephone 
number; (e) a social security number; (f) a persistent identifier, such as 
a customer number held in a cookie or a processor serial number, where 
such identifier is associated with individually identifiable information; 
or a combination of a last name or photograph of the individual with 
other information such that the combination permits physical or online 
contacting; or (g) information concerning the child or the parents of 
that child that the operator collects online from the child and combines 
with an identifier described in this definition. 
Id. 
See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN 
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/-
privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (asking for legislation establishing rules, and providing the 
FTC with regulatory authority, to govern the commercial websites that collect “personal 
identifying information” from or about consumers). 
 245. Complaint, In re Sony BMG Music Enter., FTC File No. 062 3019, at para. 18 
(Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/070130cmp-
0623019.pdf. 
 246. Id. 
 247. FTC Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2006). 
 248. Carrie Kirby, Sony Gets an Earful Over CD Software, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 
2005, at A1; Jack Kapica, CIPPIC Files Complaint Against SonyBMG Settlement, 
GLOBEANDMAIL.COM, Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/-
RTGAM.20060921.gtsony0921/TPStory/Technology/columnists; Brian Garrity, Sony 
BMG Agrees to DRM Settlement, BILLBOARD, Jan. 7, 2006, at 5; Iain Thomson, Sony 
BMG Settles Rootkit Lawsuit, VNUNET.COM, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.vnunet.com/-
vnunet/news/2148287/sony-settles-root-kit-fiasco. 
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Sony BMG’s EULA, the narrow scope of the FTC’s definition of personal 
information provides important context in which to consider Sony BMG’s 
actions. 
At the time Sony BMG put its DRM-protected CDs on the market, the 
FTC had already brought several actions—some pending and others suc-
cessfully settled—against companies that had installed software without 
appropriate notice and consent procedures.249 The majority of these cases 
involved “bundled software,”250 where EULA disclosures were found in-
sufficient to provide notice of the hidden software which typically served 
pop-up advertisements, collected click-stream data, or engaged in some 
other invasive data collection technique. Frequently the EULAs accompa-
nying bundled software include multiple embedded or linked EULAs 
making the identification of the terms of the exchange complicated and 
time-consuming.  
The software on the Sony BMG CDs, however, was not bundled in the 
traditional sense. Users did not intend to install some software but un-
knowingly install other software through the Sony BMG CD. Rather, most 
users likely did not intend to obtain any software at all during this interac-
tion. Although the hidden and unexpected nature of the transactions at the 
root of the spyware-bundling cases provided a parallel to the Sony BMG 
CDs, Sony BMG may not have understood itself to be intentionally hiding 
the software in quite the same way as spyware companies. 
                                                                                                                         
 249. FTC v. Seismic Entm’t, Inc., No. 04-377, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 (D.N.H. 
Oct. 21, 2004) (holding FTC was likely to succeed on the merits because it is an unfair 
practice to exploit a known vulnerability in the Internet Explorer web browser to 
download spyware to users’ computers without their knowledge, and enjoining this 
method of software distribution); Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public 
Comment, In re Advertising.com, FTC File No. 042 3196 (Aug. 3, 2005) (holding failure 
to clearly and conspicuously disclose bundled software that traced browsing deceptive); 
see also Complaint, FTC v. Odysseus Mktg., Inc., No. 05-CV-330 (D.N.H. Sept. 21, 
2005) (alleging that failure to clearly and conspicuously disclose bundled software with 
security and privacy risks is deceptive). 
 250. In “bundled” software offerings, the user understands that they are installing one 
program, but because they fail to read the EULA, and the software attempts to hide itself 
in other ways, they fail to understand that they are in fact installing several different 
software programs and often creating relationships with several different companies. 
Typically these programs engage in invasive activities (pop-up or other forms of push 
advertising) or extractive activities (monitoring and data collection) that users presuma-
bly would avoid if given appropriate notice. In re Advertising.com, FTC File No. 042 
3196 (Sept. 12, 2005) (holding failure to clearly and conspicuously disclose bundled 
software that traced browsing deceptive); see also Complaint, FTC v. Odysseus Mktg., 
Inc., No. 05-CV-330 (D.N.H. Sept. 21, 2005) (holding that failure to clearly and con-
spicuously disclose bundled software with security and privacy risks is deceptive). 
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In contrast to the bundled spyware cases, Sony BMG was installing 
only one piece of software and using a single EULA, which was, in form, 
consistent with the standard industry practice. The combination of stan-
dard disclosure through a EULA and the collection of no “personal infor-
mation” may have led Sony BMG to conclude that their installation and 
data collection procedures were consistent with the law and industry 
norms. This may have been further buttressed by the failure of surveil-
lance law generally to set limits on surreptitious monitoring and data col-
lection in the context of advertising and commercial dealings as long as 
such monitoring is disclosed in the EULA.251  
In the Sony BMG consent order, the FTC provided a new twist to the 
existing privacy landscape. The order stands for the propositions that: (i) 
clear and prominent notice and consent is required on CDs that condition 
access to content on the installation of software that monitors and reports 
on user activities; and (ii) clear and prominent notice and consent is re-
quired, again, before information about users, their computers, or their use 
of the CD’s content is transmitted.252 Through the Sony BMG order and 
bundled spyware orders, the FTC has established that software that col-
lects and transmits information about users, their computers, or their use 
of the content—even if not “personal information” under the COPPA 
definition—raises privacy concerns.253 The Sony BMG order also creates 
a requirement, at least with respect to Sony BMG, that the installation of 
software from a CD, and the transfer of information by such software, re-
                                                                                                                         
 251. Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1283, 1306-11 (2005) (discussing courts’ general willingness to allow consent 
to interception to be given through “click-wrap” EULA provisions and therefore limiting 
the utility of Wire Tap Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to provide remedies to a 
large set of spyware problems). 
 252. Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, FTC 
File No. 062 3019 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/-
070130agreement0623019.pdf  
 253. Where collection and transmission is part of the standard operation of internet 
protocols, clearly this cannot be the case. This line, which we are identifying, but is not 
clearly established in the settlements, may be a hard one to identify and maintain. In the 
context of traditional web-based interactions, IP addresses are routinely disclosed to the 
servers from which a user is requesting content (a web page, for example). In this context 
the requirement that notice and consent occur seems inappropriate. The Sony BMG 
phone-home feature is the opposite end of the spectrum, in that there is no need for users’ 
machines to interact with Sony BMG’s servers. There are many areas in between, and as 
technology changes, what is necessary and expected will likely change with it. 
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quires heightened “clear and prominent”254 notice and consent.255 Interest-
ingly, the order does not create an obligation to analyze the security prop-
erties of products before release. Such obligations are found in earlier FTC 
orders and the absence here is noteworthy, particularly given that a provi-
sion of Sony BMG’s settlement with the Attorney Generals requires that at 
least one qualified, independent third-party expert review future content 
protection software and conclude that it creates no “confirmed security 
vulnerabilities” prior to use by Sony BMG.256  
Like the security vulnerability at issue in prior FTC actions, rootkits 
and privilege escalation are known, dangerous security vulnerabilities. 
However several factors make the Sony BMG system distinct, and dis-
tinctly troubling. As discussed supra in Part II, it seems likely that the 
choices to design and deploy software with these security vulnerabilities 
were deliberate and intentional design decisions, not failures of otherwise 
secure software or loopholes left unaddressed despite a security-conscious 
design process. Reflecting these distinctions, the FTC complaint against 
Sony BMG and, to some extent, the final order, included an unfairness 
claim based on the installation of the security vulnerabilities and the lack 
of adequate notice and consent during installation in addition to deception 
claims based on the affirmatively misleading omissions of material facts.  
The unfairness claim is the most important element of the order be-
cause unfairness does not rely upon the content or sufficiency of state-
ments made to the public, but rather evaluates the substantive impact of 
                                                                                                                         
 254. See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, FTC 
File No. 062 3019 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/-
070130agreement0623019.pdf  
[T]he disclosure shall be unavoidable and shall be presented prior to the 
consumer installing any content protection software or, if the disclosure 
is related to Internet connectivity, prior to causing any transmission to 
respondent about consumers, their computers, or their use of a covered 
product through Internet servers. The disclosure shall be of a size and 
shade, and shall appear on the screen for a duration, sufficient for an 
ordinary consumer to read and comprehend it. The disclosure shall be 
in understandable language and syntax. 
Id. 
 255. See id. (prohibiting downloads unless a consumer “dictates his/her assent to in-
stall such software by clicking on a button or link that is clearly labeled or otherwise 
clearly represented to convey that it will activate the installation, or by taking a substan-
tially similar action”). 
 256. Settlement Agreement at 27, In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litig., No. 1:05-CV-
09575 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28. 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/-
sony_settlement.pdf. 
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the businesses activity itself. In this way it is akin to substantive uncon-
scionability in contract law. The FTC found that Sony BMG’s installation 
practices and security vulnerabilities caused substantial injury that users 
could not reasonably avoid and were not outweighed by any countervail-
ing interests.257  
The Sony BMG order set two important new baselines. First, the com-
plaint and ensuing order make clear that certain software may not be in-
stalled on a user’s computer regardless of the consent experience.258 In 
particular it prohibits the installation of content protection software that 
hides, cloaks or misnames files, folders, or directories, or misrepresents 
the purpose or effect of files, directory folders, formats, or registry en-
tries.259 This effectively prohibits the installation of content protection 
software that uses a rootkit like the one contained in XCP. While the order 
does not explicitly prohibit software that alters system, directory, or file 
privileges, such as MediaMax, it does require that such software be fairly 
represented to the consumer both through disclosures during installation 
and appropriate naming conventions.260 
Second, where limits are placed on the expected functionality of a CD 
or information about the consumers’ use of the CD is to be transferred, the 
user must receive clear and prominent notice and must communicate as-
sent affirmatively.261 This extends to information beyond the personally 
identifiable information traditionally at the heart of the FTC’s privacy ini-
tiatives and enforcement actions. The first of these provisions is signifi-
cant because it begins to establish an obligation to provide heightened no-
tice aimed at truly informing consumers of material changes to functional-
ity of media containing copyrighted works. The second is significant be-
                                                                                                                         
 257. See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, FTC 
File No. 062 3019 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623019/-
070130agreement0623019.pdf. 
 258. Id. at 6. 
 259. Id.  
[Software] shall not install or cause to be installed on a consumer’s computer 
any content protection software that prevents the consumer from readily locating 
or removing the software, including but not limited to by: (1) hiding or cloaking 
files, folders, or directories; (2) using random or misleading names for files, 
folders, or directories; or (3) misrepresenting the purpose or effect of files, direc-
tory folders, formats, or registry entries. 
Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
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cause it recognizes a privacy interest in surveillance separate from the fo-
cus of prior FTC activity dealing with personally identifiable information. 
The FTC and state Attorneys General settlements in the Sony BMG 
matter are a testament to the power of broad and flexible grants of author-
ity that provide a basis for tailoring responses to new marketplace prac-
tices that mislead or injure consumers and materially disrupt settled con-
sumer expectations. But at the same time, the fact that a large, reputable 
company of Sony BMG’s stature was likely unaware that it was acting de-
ceptively or unfairly highlights the problems the FTC and state Attorneys 
General face in attempting to endorse and enforce marketplace practices 
that promote meaningful contracting in the online environment. Given the 
judiciary’s unwillingness to set limits or boundaries on the formalities or 
substance of contracting, this is a particularly daunting task.262 A case-by-
case approach, whether undertaken in agencies or courts, fails to provide 
clear guidance to companies seeking to engage fairly with consumers and 
allows ample room for companies to use EULAs to obtain “consent” to 
overreaching and egregious practices that are inconsistent with consumer 
expectations or that pose harm. The ongoing struggle within industry to 
define self-regulatory rules to distinguish legitimate software and business 
practices from spyware, as well as the ever-growing legislative efforts to 
address spyware, are a tribute to the yawning grey zone confronting both 
businesses and consumers and the inadequacy of current contract law to 
assist in their navigation. 
VI. REALIGNING SKEWED INCENTIVES  
Having traced the constraints and influences that encouraged and per-
mitted Sony BMG to deploy its DRM strategy, this Part offers potential 
reforms, both legal and technical, aimed at reshaping the system of incen-
tives that gave rise to the rootkit incident to guard against future harm to 
the public and the network. First, we build upon the Copyright Office’s 
most recent DMCA rulemaking and suggest a permanent statutory exemp-
tion that enables researchers and lay users to proactively identify and re-
move dangerous protection measures from their systems. Second, we look 
to insights drawn from the field of HCI-Sec as an additional foundation for 
the development of more effective notice and consent guidelines and stan-
dards governing software downloads and online data collection practices. 
We argue that the FTC is the best situated institution for incorporating in-
                                                                                                                         
 262. Copyright Protection and Management Systems, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). 
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terdisciplinary insights, such as HCI-Sec, in developing such guidelines 
and standards. 
But before outlining these recommendations, two antithetical but 
equally misguided reactions to the rootkit incident should be addressed. 
First, a superficial overview of the rootkit incident may suggest—and 
some will certainly argue—that no response is necessary. Sony BMG, the 
argument will go, miscalculated the tradeoff between preventing in-
fringement and protecting user security, as a matter of both law and mar-
keting. The investigations, lawsuits, and settlements that came in the wake 
of XCP and MediaMax simply demonstrate that the corrective mecha-
nisms already in place served their function by holding Sony BMG ac-
countable for its socially harmful behavior. The public flogging Sony 
BMG received from the press, consumer advocate groups, state Attorneys 
General, and the FTC will stand as a warning to other content owners and 
DRM vendors to behave more responsibly in the future. 
Although it is undoubtedly true that no record label is likely to intro-
duce protection measures that install rootkits on their customers’ com-
puters anytime soon, the ways in which privacy and security can be com-
promised by DRM are numerous. So long as the system of incentives that 
produced the rootkit incident remains in place, we can expect further 
abuses in the future. Although “rootkit” remains a watchword in the world 
of content protection, institutional memories—much like public aware-
ness—will fade. Rather than relying solely on the content industry’s insis-
tence that it has learned its lesson, responsible public policy requires insti-
tutional reforms that recognize and counteract the lure of overzealous 
DRM implementation. Moreover, the anti-interventionist position fails to 
account for the importance of public interest advocates, the press, and 
public outcry in pressuring Sony BMG to settle the legal claims brought 
against it. Such a fortuitous feedback loop cannot be guaranteed in the fu-
ture, and the protection of end user and network security should not hinge 
on something as rare and unpredictable as the perfect storm.  
Second, standing in stark contrast to this hands-off approach is one 
that calls for prohibitions on particular technologies in the name of con-
sumer protection. But the rootkit incident should not be understood to 
make a case for legislation that mandates or prohibits particular techno-
logical design decisions. In an extreme form, such legislation could ban 
the use of rootkits—or even DRM—altogether.263 This response is mis-
                                                                                                                         
 263. Although the FTC’s Sony BMG order prohibited Sony BMG from using any 
content protection software that incorporates a rootkit or similar technology, this is a far 
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guided for a number of reasons. Both rootkits and DRM can, in some in-
stances, serve useful and legitimate purposes. DRM can enable new busi-
ness models, such as digital video “rental,” that as a matter of economics 
would prove impossible without some enforcement mechanism for use 
restrictions.264 Likewise, legitimate software developers, such as anti-virus 
vendors, have used rootkits to protect their programs from attack.265  
While not as pernicious as technological mandates, prohibitions 
against particular software tools could set dangerous legislative precedent. 
As a matter of institutional competence, legislators are poorly positioned 
to insert themselves into the design decisions of technology developers. 
Congress, in drafting the DMCA, recognized the bounds of its expertise as 
well as the risks to innovation posed by governmental interference in the 
minutiae of software and product design.266 Rather than the immediate 
constraints on design alternatives that would result from a technological 
mandate, banning particular software or product components could give 
rise to a legislative incrementalism that in time will yield the same unfor-
tunate result.  
Aside from being dangerous, this tack would also prove ineffective. In 
all likelihood, rootkits will not prove the next serious threat to end user 
security and privacy. Legislative or regulatory efforts that narrowly target 
specific technologies will almost always come a day too late to provide 
meaningful protection for consumers and network resources.267 Rather 
                                                                                                                         
cry from generally applicable legislation that constrains all technology developers and all 
potential products. See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Sony BMG Music 
Entm’t, FTC File No. 062 3019 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/-
caselist/0623019/-070130agreement0623019.pdf.  
 264. Whether the enforcement mechanism requires or deserves the benefit of legisla-
tion like the DMCA to introduce the force of law as an additional layer of enforcement is 
analytically distinct from the technology’s importance to new business models. 
 265. This decision stirred controversy. See supra note 2. 
 266. Copyright Protection and Management Systems, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3).  
(3) Nothing in this section shall require that the design of, or design and selec-
tion of parts and components for, a consumer electronics, telecommunications, 
or computing product provide for a response to any particular technological 
measure, so long as such part or component, or the product in which such part or 
component is integrated, does not otherwise fall within the prohibitions of sub-
section (a)(2) or (b)(1). 
Id.  
 267. Stefanie Olsen, Nearly Undetectable Tracking Device Raises Concern, CNET 
NEWS.COM, July 12, 2000, http://news.com.com/2100-1017-243077.html; Posting of Pe-
ter Fleisher to The Official Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/07/-
cookies-expiring-sooner-to-improve.html (July 16, 2007 09:52 PST); BRUCE H. KOBA-
YASHI & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, A RECIPE FOR COOKIES: STATE REGULATION OF CONSUMER 
 
2007] THE MAGNIFICENCE OF THE DISASTER 1221 
than seeking to prevent a carbon copy of the most recent disaster, any use-
ful response must attempt to reform the underlying factors that spur con-
tent owners to adopt dangerous DRM. 
A. Enabling Security Research and Self-Help Through a Statutory 
Exemption to the DMCA 
As described supra, the DMCA, by discouraging security research and 
criminalizing the distribution of software tools that enable users to protect 
themselves from harmful DRM, served as a key component of the legal 
landscape that permitted the rootkit debacle.268 By establishing a perma-
nent statutory exemption from DMCA liability, Congress could take a sig-
nificant step towards preventing future threats to end user and network 
security.  
In drafting the DMCA, Congress recognized the need to respond to 
changing circumstances given the fluidity of the nascent environment it 
sought to prospectively regulate and the otherwise lawful uses that might 
be adversely affected by the broad prohibition on circumvention. To retain 
some flexibility, Congress created a rulemaking proceeding that serves as 
a “fail-safe mechanism” intended to ensure that limits on the prohibition 
on circumvention keep pace with developments in the market for copy-
righted works.269 This proceeding requires the Librarian of Congress, act-
ing on the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, to conduct a 
rulemaking hearing to identify classes of copyrighted works the nonin-
fringing uses of which are likely to be adversely affected by the prohibi-
tion on circumvention in the succeeding three year period.270 Users of 
copyrighted works that fall within exempt classes are not subject to the 
prohibition against circumvention.271 
                                                                                                                         
MARKETING INFORMATION (2001), http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/papers/docs/-01-
04.pdf. 
 268. See supra Section V.A. 
 269. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 35 (1998). As the Report explained, “The pri-
mary goal of the rulemaking proceeding is to assess whether the prevalence of these 
technological protections, with respect to particular categories of copyrighted materials, 
is diminishing the ability of individuals to use these works in ways that are otherwise 
lawful.” Id. at 37. 
 270. See § 1201(a)(1)(C). For a detailed discussion and overview of the DMCA 
rulemaking process, the exemptions granted in 2006, and the limitations of this process in 
providing adequate protection to the public, see generally Aaron Perzanowski, Evolving 
Standards and the Future of the DMCA Anticircumvention Rulemaking, 10 J. OF INTER-
NET L., Apr. 2007, at 1. 
 271. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
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In 2006, the Copyright Office recommended, and the Librarian of 
Congress granted, an exemption requested by the Samuelson Law, Tech-
nology & Public Policy Clinic of the University of California, Berkeley 
School of Law, on behalf of Felten and Halderman272 that permits the cir-
cumvention of technological protection measures distributed on audio CDs 
when those measures create or exploit vulnerabilities that compromise the 
security of personal computers.273 This exemption, crafted to closely track 
the facts of the rootkit incident in light of the Copyright Office’s tradition-
ally conservative attitude toward the granting of exemption proposals,274 
offers meaningful protection to both lay users and researchers who seek to 
eliminate security vulnerabilities introduced by DRM on audio CDs. Prior 
to the exemption, genuine legal uncertainty existed as to whether a user 
who unknowingly installed XCP could be held liable under the DMCA for 
its removal or whether a researcher who bypassed the DRM in an effort to 
discern its operation violated section 1201.275 
                                                                                                                         
 272. See generally Comment of Edward W. Felten & J. Alex Halderman to the 
United States Copyright Office, supra note 89. 
 273. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. § 201.40), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2006/71fr68472.html; 
Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, United States Copyright 
Office, to James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress, concerning Rulemaking on Ex-
emptions from Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies (Nov. 17, 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/-
docs/1201_recommendation.pdf. 
 274. Somewhat surprisingly, the Copyright Office revisited the standards for the 
DMCA Rulemaking in 2006, potentially opening the door for an increase in narrowly 
tailored exemptions. See Perzanowski, supra note 270, at 19-20. 
 275. In something of an ironic turn, copyright industry representatives sought to de-
feat the exemption by claiming that: (i) the protection measures used on CDs were copy 
controls rather than access controls, and thus outside the scope of the anti-circumvention 
provisions; (ii) existing statutory exemptions, most notably the security testing exemption 
of section 1201(j), rendered an exemption unnecessary; and (iii) Sony BMG’s voluntary 
release of a tool to uninstall the rootkit obviated the need for an exemption. See generally 
Testimony of Steven Metalitz, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/transcript-
mar31.pdf; Joint Reply Comment, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11-
metalitz_AAP.pdf. Rejecting these arguments, the Register concluded that because par-
ticular software was required to play a CD on a computer, the technical protection meas-
ure used in the DRM at issue was an access control. Memorandum from Marybeth Peters, 
supra note 273, at 56. Because the scope of section 1201(j)—a provision not yet mean-
ingfully interpreted by the courts—was ambiguous, the Register concluded that consid-
eration of the exemption on its merits was appropriate. In light of the need for researchers 
to identify security vulnerabilities created by CD protection measures, the dangers posed 
by such measures to consumers, the unclear potential liability under the DMCA, and the 
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However, the new exemption and the rulemaking procedure itself are 
insufficient tools to address the security risks posed by technological pro-
tection measures. First, the exemption is temporary, with an expiration 
date of October 2009.276 Second, the exemption applies only to the extent 
circumvention occurs for the sole purpose of good faith testing, investigat-
ing, or correcting security vulnerabilities, leaving some risk that those who 
also hope to place music on their iPods after eliminating the security 
threats could face liability.277 Third, the exemption is limited to a particu-
lar medium—the Compact Disc—and a particular type of work—sound 
recordings. While these limitations were necessary as a practical matter to 
secure the endorsement of the Register of Copyrights, they are by no 
means ideal from a policy perspective. Protection measures that create se-
curity vulnerabilities could be introduced in a multitude of media in con-
nection with any type of copyrighted work. As discussed supra, a solution 
tied to the specific facts of yesterday’s disaster fails to account for varia-
tions on the theme. 
But from a practical standpoint, by far the most fundamental inade-
quacy of the DMCA rulemaking is inherent in the Copyright Office’s 
statutory authority. The rulemaking can exempt certain classes of works 
from the anti-circumvention provision, but Congress vested no authority in 
the Copyright Office or Librarian of Congress to grant corresponding ex-
emptions from the anti-trafficking provisions.278 This asymmetry gives 
rise to a rather perverse result: an act of circumvention is permitted by an 
exemption, but the tools necessary to take advantage of that privileged use 
                                                                                                                         
resulting adverse impact on the ability to engage in noninfringing uses, the Register rec-
ommended adoption of the exemption. Id. 
 276. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,472, available at http://www.-
copyright.gov/fedreg/2006/71fr68472.html. Maintaining the exemption will require proof 
of ongoing harm during the next rulemaking. Broadening it to cover additional techno-
logical protection measures found to present security risks will require separate showings 
of ongoing harm to a class of works. Given the fallout over the Sony BMG DRM, it is 
possible that no protection measures that create security risks will be released on CDs in 
the coming three years, making it impossible to renew the exemption. While this will 
mean that no security-flaw-riddled DRM is on the marketplace, it will also remove an 
important incentive for copyright holders to ensure the safety of their protection measures 
going forward. See Perzanowski, supra note 270. 
 277. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems 
for Access Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,472, available at http://www.-
copyright.gov/fedreg/2006/71fr68472.html. 
 278. Copyright Protection and Management Systems, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).  
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remain illegal.279 Thus although both the public and security researchers 
may engage in circumvention under the new exemption, researchers like 
Felten and Halderman could still face potential liability for distributing 
tools to assist the public in exercising this exemption. Given that the aver-
age CD purchaser will possess neither the knowledge nor ability to elimi-
nate the security risks of a protection measure without a software tool, the 
inability of the exemption process to free experts to develop tools renders 
this new right much less meaningful. 
The solution to the shortcomings of the DMCA rulemaking must be a 
legislative one.280 But rather than simply extend the authority of the Copy-
right Office to include the power to exempt classes of works from the 
DMCA’s anti-trafficking provisions as well—a development the authors 
would welcome—Congress should simply expand the existing permanent 
statutory exemption found in section 1201(j) to permit both circumvention 
and trafficking to the extent undertaken to investigate or eliminate protec-
tion measures that “create or exploit security flaws or vulnerabilities that 
compromise the security of personal computers.”281  
B. Developing Meaningful Notice and Consent Mechanisms 
through Interdisciplinary Insight and Agency Action 
As discussed supra, the security vulnerabilities in the DRM Sony 
BMG deployed are best viewed as intentional design choices. While Sony 
BMG is responsible for deploying dangerous software, the ease with 
which the software could be surreptitiously installed on consumers’ ma-
                                                                                                                         
 279. The “reverse notice and takedown” process put forward by Reichman, Din-
woodie, and Samuelson in this volume proposes to address the limited technical ability of 
the general public by requiring copyright owners to take down technical protections to 
make tools for “public good” uses. Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, & Pam-
ela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses 
of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007). This 
innovative approach would instill some needed balance back into the DMCA; however, it 
will not create room for research on protection measures themselves, nor create a safe 
harbor for those who create tools to enable users to make public good uses. Id. 
 280. Representatives Rick Boucher and John Doolittle’s Freedom And Innovation 
Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act would enshrine the current temporary exemptions 
and add additional valuable permanent exemptions; it does not, however, address the 
unnecessarily narrow scope of the “rootkit” exemption. H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007). 
The authors humbly suggest that the bill would benefit from incorporation of the recom-
mendations contained in this section.  
 281. Currently section 1201(j) applies only to (a)(1) and (a)(2). 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) 
(2000). In light of the tortured distinction between copy controls and access controls, its 
scope should be expanded to include section 1201(b) as well.  
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chines causes us to reflect on the state of consumer control over the activi-
ties—software downloads and data collection and transmission—
occurring on their desktops more generally. Consumer protection law has 
an important role to play in reforming the notice and consent process with 
respect to software installation and data collection practices.  
But we believe that innovative reforms in this area will come about 
from a broader interdisciplinary approach. The FTC decisions discussed 
supra, in Section V.C, begin to chart a course in this direction. Incorporat-
ing insight from the field of HCI-Sec would enable the FTC and other 
consumer protection agencies to craft guidelines for language and mecha-
nisms to facilitate effective notice and informed consent. Such guidelines 
would vest consumers with increased control of the software downloaded 
onto their machines and the information collected and transmitted about 
their activities.  
A growing team of HCI-Sec researchers is exploring “usable privacy 
and security.”282 The Sony BMG disaster is one in a string of examples of 
the difficulties facing computer users in making good security and privacy 
choices about their computing environment.283 It is imperative that users 
understand, value, and implement security. The question under exploration 
                                                                                                                         
 282. See HCISec Bibliography, http://www.gaudior.net/alma/biblio.html, for an up-
to-date list of contributions in this field. With respect to privacy, HCISec practitioners 
have studied a variety of fields. For research on browsers, see, for example, Batya Fried-
man, Daniel C. Howe, & Edward Felten, Informed Consent in the Mozilla Browser: Im-
plementing Value-Sensitive Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL HA-
WAI’I INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES; Umesh Shankar & Chris Kar-
lof, Doppelganger: Better Browser Privacy Without the Bother, in THIRTEENTH ACM 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (2006); for peer-to-peer 
file-sharing research, see, for example, Nathaniel S. Good & Aaron Krekelberg, Usability 
and Privacy: A Study of Kazaa P2P File-Sharing, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM CON-
FERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHI 2003); for notices and spy-
ware acquisition, see, for example, Mulligan et al., supra note 234; for operating system 
research, see, for example, Alex J. DeWitt & Jasna Kuljis, Aligning Usability And Secu-
rity—A Usability Study Of Polaris, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2006 SYMPOSIUM ON US-
ABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 12-14 (2006); and for phishing, see, for example, Rachna 
Dhamija & J.D. Tygar, The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins, SYMPO-
SIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2005); Rachna Dhamija, J.D. Tygar, & Marti 
Hearst, Why Phishing Works, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN 
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS (2006). 
 283. See A. Herzog et al., User Help Techniques for Usable Security, PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE 2007 SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTER HUMAN INTERACTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, Article No. 11 (2007) (discussing research revealing that 
inadequate usability results in security failures in many contexts including firewalls, 
Internet Explorer, Word, Outlook Express, encrypting email clients, and login systems). 
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in the HCI-Sec community, and directly relevant to the consumer protec-
tion mandate of the FTC and related agencies, is how to make privacy and 
security compelling, usable, and routine to end-users.  
One problem with current user interface design is that users do not 
play a central role in controlling their security and privacy choices. Anti-
virus and anti-spyware vendors have stepped in to assist users in maintain-
ing a safe computing environment, but reliance on third-party vendors for 
defense is insufficient due to the contextual, process-based nature of both 
privacy and security.284 For example, the same program functionality can 
have radically different consequences depending upon the context—
compare a parent’s installation of a program to create a safe online experi-
ence for a child to a similar program installed by a third party on the ma-
chine of an unconsenting adult. Given that users’ opinions about the desir-
ability of particular functionalities may be dramatically altered by the con-
text of its intended use, effective privacy and security management must 
allow users to play a central role in controlling their privacy and security 
profiles. Because of this contextual variation of the value of privacy and 
security tools, techniques that fail to account for user autonomy are un-
workable, even if the current state of desktop security and privacy tools is 
beyond the grasp of the average user.285 
The failure of consumers to appropriately respond to disclosures of the 
privacy and security features of their products poses another problem. Re-
search in HCI-Sec and related fields finds that information about a prod-
uct’s functionality, even when fully and accurately disclosed, often fails to 
capture the attention of computer users or to aid them in acting in a man-
                                                                                                                         
 284. By “contextual”, we mean that decisions about information flow and access, 
integral to utilizing both privacy and security, tend to be context-dependent rather than 
absolute, i.e., individuals’ concerns may vary widely depending upon the nature of per-
ceived risks, which is related to the information or activity to be protected and the parties 
involved. For an exploration of the contextual nature of privacy, see Helen Nissenbaum, 
Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004). By “process-based”, we 
mean that providing security and privacy requires an ongoing evaluation of emerging 
threats, changing resources of adversaries, and changes in technology. One cannot adopt 
a policy to protect either at a given point in time and consider protection complete.  
 285. The remainder of this section primarily explores mechanisms for engaging users 
in effective decision-making. Another common approach to security is to build it in and 
automate it to the extent possible. These techniques are not mutually exclusive, but re-
flect differences in orientation to system design, the first being user-centric, the second 
being security- and system-centric. See Ka-Ping Yee, User Interaction Design for Secure 
Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION 
AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 2513), 278-
290 (2002); Herzog et al., supra note 283. 
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ner consistent with their stated interests.286 If the legal framework is to ac-
tually aid consumers in marketplace transactions, a primary goal of con-
sumer protection agencies should be making security and privacy “us-
able.”  
A number of barriers hinder efforts to engage users in privacy and se-
curity decision-making.287 First, security is typically a secondary concern 
undertaken in support of some other objective.288 Second, there is little 
time or tolerance for trial and error in security decision-making, as deci-
sions must be correct the first time.289 Third, experimental research dem-
onstrates that users’ stated privacy preferences do not always align with 
their behavior290 and that during task completion users will put off privacy 
or security protective behaviors.291 Fourth, cognitive biases lead individu-
als to discount future privacy or security losses if presented with an imme-
diate benefit,292 reinforcing all of the above. These barriers combine with 
more generic problems, identified in the context of notice design gener-
ally,293 to create a very difficult problem and design space.  
Building upon the usability metrics of effectiveness, efficiency, and 
satisfaction,294 HCI-Sec researchers have developed guidelines for align-
                                                                                                                         
 286. Good et al., supra note 234; Mulligan et al., supra note 234 (concluding in part 
that users’ failure to delve into documentation describing software functionality stems 
from the incomprehensible nature of the EULAs that typically house these disclosures).  
 287. Much of the discussion below draws on work on either security or privacy, and 
in a few instances both. For the points we are highlighting, we believe that the research 
on privacy and security can be generalized across the two topics.  
 288. Herzog et al., supra note 283; J. Hardee et al., To Download or not to 
Download: An Examination of Computer Security Decision Making, INTERACTIONS (May 
& June 2006), at 32.  
 289. Herzog et al., supra note 283. 
 290. Hardee et al., supra note 288.  
 291. Id. 
 292. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 103. 
 293. HCI researchers are studying the effects of notification systems in computing 
generally, in particular focusing on cognitive response to interruptions. Notification sys-
tems often use visualization or auditory techniques to simply convey information with 
minimal distraction from primary tasks. A broad range of research has examined the crea-
tion of effective notice systems that limit the chances of warnings being dismissed or 
ignored. See E. Cutrell, M. Czerwinski, & E. Horvitz, Notification, Disruption and Mem-
ory: Effects of Messaging Interruptions on Memory and Performance, in HUMAN-
COMPUTER INTERACTION: INTERACT ’01 263 (Michitaka Hirose ed. 2001), available at 
http://research.microsoft.com/~cutrell/interact2001messaging.pdf. 
 294. ISO standard 9241-11 defines usability as the “[e]xtent to which a product can 
be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and 
satisfaction in a specified context of use.” “Effectiveness is defined as the accuracy and 
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ing security and usability,295 as well as an approach that recognizes the 
importance of user autonomy in framing security considerations.296 Using 
the guidelines and methodologies of HCI-Sec to analyze the design of 
                                                                                                                         
completeness with which users achieve specified goals.” “Efficiency is measured by re-
lating the level of effectiveness achieved to the resources used.” “Satisfaction (defined as 
freedom from discomfort and positive attitudes to the use of the product) is a response of 
users to interaction with the product.” See Halderman & Felten, supra note 11. 
 295. Yee, supra note 285. 
Path of Least Resistance. The most natural way to do any task should 
also be the most secure way.  
Appropriate Boundaries. The interface should expose, and the system 
should enforce, distinctions between objects and between actions along 
boundaries that matter to the user.  
Explicit Authorization. A user’s authorities must only be provided to 
other actors as a result of an explicit user action that is understood to 
imply granting.  
Visibility. The interface should allow the user to easily review any ac-
tive actors and authority relationships that would affect security-
relevant decisions.  
Revocability. The interface should allow the user to easily revoke au-
thorities that the user has granted, wherever revocation is possible.  
Expected Ability. The interface must not give the user the impression 
that it is possible to do something that cannot actually be done.  
Trusted Path. The interface must provide an unspoofable and faithful 
communication channel between the user and any entity trusted to ma-
nipulate authorities on the user’s behalf.  
Identifiability. The interface should enforce that distinct objects and 
distinct actions have unspoofably identifiable and distinguishable rep-
resentations.  
Expressiveness. The interface should provide enough expressive power 
(a) to describe a safe security policy without undue difficulty; and (b) 
to allow users to express security policies in terms that fit their goals.  
Clarity. The effect of any security-relevant action must be clearly ap-
parent to the user before the action is taken.  
Id. Saltzer and Schroeder also suggest: 
[Least privilege.] Every program and every user of the system should 
operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. 
J. H. Saltzer & M. D. Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer Sys-
tems, in 63-9 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, 1278, available at http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/-
www/publications/protection/. 
See also D. Balfanz, D.K. Smetters, & R. Grinter, In Search of Usable Security: Five 
Lessons from the Field, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY (Sept.-Oct. 2004), at 19; I. Flechais, 
A.M. Sasse, & S.M.V. Hailes, Bringing Security Home: A Process For Developing Se-
cure and Usable Systems, in WORKSHOP ON NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS 49 (2003). 
 296. Yee, supra note 285. 
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AutoRun identifies core ways in which its design facilitated, or at least 
failed to prevent, Sony BMG’s behavior.  
The process of software installation under the default configurations of 
AutoRun violated several HCI-Sec usable security principles.297 First, the 
principle of explicit authorization requires that delegations of authority 
require explicit user action that is actually understood by the user as an act 
of delegation. The decision of what software is on a machine is generally a 
decision for users.298 By allowing others to install software without pro-
viding users with notice and the ability to affirmatively delegate or with-
hold the privilege of doing so, AutoRun ran afoul of this design principle. 
The failure of AutoRun to expose the action of downloading to the user in 
a meaningful manner ran afoul of the visibility principle as well. Visibility 
requires the interface to represent, in an easily understandable manner, all 
active actors and authority relationships (who can take what action 
amongst actors or on resources) that would affect security-relevant deci-
sions.299 The pop-up security notices produced by AutoRun did not 
achieve the level of expressiveness sufficient to describe a safe security 
policy and allow users to choose among security options.300 In addition, 
the effect of installing the DRM software on the security of the users’ sys-
tem was not apparent to the users either before, during, or after installa-
tion. This violates the clarity principle.301 Finally, the rootkit violated the 
principle of revocability by making it exceedingly difficult for the user to 
revoke her delegation.302 
The HCI-Sec principles of explicit authorization, visibility, expres-
siveness, clarity, and revocability are reflected to some extent in the FTC 
Sony BMG order which directs more forthright communication with users 
and greater affirmative control over the installation of software and the 
collection and transmission of data. Through enforcement actions against 
spyware distributors, the Federal Trade Commission and state Attorneys 
                                                                                                                         
 297. For the purpose of this analysis we use the principles set forth in Yee, supra note 
285. They are more inclusive and detailed that those found in other discussions of this 
subject. For several case studies on usability and security and additional insight into inte-
grating them into the design process, see HCISec Bibliography, supra note 282.  
 298. Yee, supra note 285. In the context of an employer-employee relationship, the 
employer often makes decisions about computer configuration and software. 
 299. See id. 
 300. Id. See also Herzog et al., supra note 283 (critiquing “security by pop-up win-
dows” based on research that shows it leads users to click through to return to the first 
order task).  
 301. Id. 
 302. Id.  
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General have begun to establish what are likely to become de facto poli-
cies limiting the reliance on EULAs as a means of adequate disclosure 
with respect to spyware programs, and perhaps other downloadable soft-
ware. The consent orders and judgments establish a new form of consent, 
“express consent,” which must be obtained prior to the installation, sepa-
rate and apart from the EULA.  
The efforts of HCI-Sec researchers are buttressed by efforts in the pri-
vate sector to establish best practices for the notice and consent experience 
mechanism in response to the growing problems with spyware.303 The An-
tispyware Coalition, a group of anti-spyware software companies, academ-
ics, and consumer groups building consensus about definitions and best 
practices in the debate surrounding spyware and other potentially un-
wanted technologies, similarly concluded that “EULAs alone are usually 
not enough to offset risk behaviors.” Just as “express consent” as defined 
by the FTC and state Attorneys General requires “clear and prominent” 
disclosures, the Coalition’s best practices require “clear and prominent” 
disclosures to be unavoidable and accessible (language, presentation, size) 
to “an ordinary consumer.” They also establish heightened demands for 
communicating assent, requiring that software installations are clearly in-
dicated on the button or other user interface that activates them.304 In addi-
tion, these agreements begin to constrain the bundling of spyware and ad-
ware software with “free” programs to deceive consumers, and set proce-
dural and substantive rules about uninstall procedures.305 
                                                                                                                         
 303. ANTI-SPYWARE COALITION, supra note 185 (“For potentially unwanted tech-
nologies, EULAs alone are usually not enough to offset risk behaviors. Individual con-
sent of risky behaviors may be appropriate.”). The document addresses issues around 
remote control software, privacy, and other issues arising in the context of the Sony BMG 
DRM-protected CDs. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id.  
Potentially unwanted software should ask for user consent before soft-
ware technology is installed or uninstalled, or if any personal informa-
tion about users will be collected during software technology installa-
tion or when the software application is running. After providing a 
prominent notice about what is about to occur, users should be pre-
sented with a clear, easy-to-understand choice. For the consent to be 
meaningful, the purposes for which the information is being collected 
and will be used should be stated in a matter reasonably understandable 
to the user. Nothing should happen unless users provide a clear, af-
firmative ‘Yes’ to whatever is proposed. If users choose not to agree, 
there should be no disruption or interference with the computing ex-
perience. There should not, as a condition to the supply of a product or 
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If we assume that courts will continue to treat EULAs and other no-
tices as a proxy for a “meeting of the minds” sufficient to bind consumers 
to license terms, then HCI-Sec methods of improving feedback and con-
trol are useful tools to aid policy makers and the private sector in the crea-
tion of better notices and consent experiences. We believe the HCI-Sec 
principles should be a component of FTC action to develop security and 
privacy best practices and rules for software downloads based on the more 
stringent notice and consent procedures found in the Sony BMG and spy-
ware decisions and orders. 
The FTC is the natural place to build upon the work begun in the pri-
vate sector, and to pull in additional expertise from disciplines including 
HCI-Sec, behavioral economics, and computer and information security to 
create best practices and potentially new rules to guide the interactions 
between consumers and businesses in the online environment. The FTC is 
far better suited to engage in the policy analysis and balancing required by 
this activity than the courts or even Congress. The need for flexible stan-
dards as opposed to hard and fast rules lends itself to the ongoing over-
sight of an agency, like the FTC, that can continue to revisit and alter 
standards as the market evolves.  
Finally, improving the extent to which individuals understand that they 
are compromising security will not necessarily reduce the likelihood of 
such compromises if users acting in their own self interest nonetheless 
make poor security choices in a networked environment. Given the exter-
nalities posed by users’ decisions to impair the security of their own ma-
chines—even those made knowingly, based on full and accurate informa-
tion—the FTC must determine those terms to which users may not consent 
due to public policy concerns about the overall security of the information 
infrastructure.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article set out to explain the market, technological, and legal fac-
tors that led Sony BMG toward a DRM strategy that, in retrospect, appears 
obviously and fundamentally misguided. Examining Sony BMG’s long 
and unfortunate series of missteps offers important insights into necessary 
reforms of market practices, policy interventions, and the technology it-
                                                                                                                         
service, be a requirement for a user to consent to the collection, use, or 
disclosure of information beyond what is required to provide the ser-
vices or applications in question without clear choices for the user.”  
Id. 
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self. The confluence of factors that encouraged, enabled, and failed to pre-
vent Sony BMG’s actions are complicated and interdependent. Unsurpris-
ingly, we conclude that preventing similar future incidents requires ap-
proaches that incorporate technology and law and respond to the relevant 
market conditions.  
Until average users are better equipped with intuitive tools and con-
cise, compelling information describing relevant risks and benefits, they 
will be unable to manage the security of their machines. And unless users 
can take control of their security, we will be forced to choose between an 
increasingly insecure networked environment and one with diminished 
adherence to the end-to-end principle306 as security management migrates 
from the desktop towards the center of the network. 
Genuine end user control over security decisions relies on a level of 
transparency regarding the functionality and risks posed by software that 
can be assured only through independent public-minded security research. 
Such research can proceed at the necessary pace only once the threat of 
DMCA liability is lifted.  
But the availability of information exposing these threats alone is in-
sufficient. Both technology and law have a role to play in shaping usable 
security and privacy solutions. Technology can help to inform users and 
enforce their preferences to the extent those preferences can be accurately 
expressed and their violation detected. Users need the law to force the 
honest disclosure of terms and risks, and to protect them against over-
reaching license terms. And, in some rare circumstances, the law must 
prohibit certain risks that we cannot afford for users to accept in highly 
networked environments, regardless of their willingness.  
If DRM is to emerge as a tool that benefits consumers through the in-
troduction of new business models and innovative pricing structures, the 
terms of these transactions must be clearly and meaningfully presented to 
consumers. Unless consumers understand the rights granted and costs im-
posed by these transactions—among them sacrificed privacy and secu-
rity—DRM will remain a tool that exclusively benefits copyright holders, 
while presenting consumers with, at best, inconvenience and, at worst, 
violations of their security, privacy, and expectations. 
                                                                                                                         
 306. The end-to-end principle holds that complexity should be concentrated at the 
edges of a network rather than at its center. This principle gives rise to complex end 
points and relatively simple networks connecting them. See generally J.H. Saltzer, D.P. 
Reed & D.D. Clark, End-to-end Arguments in System Design, http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/-
www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf (1981).  
